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The Economic Efficiency Case 
Against Business Tax Privacy 
Daniel Schaffa* 
By statute, business tax returns are not publicly available.  But with 
public access, investors would acquire useful information that would help 
them make better investing decisions; business tax compliance and planning 
would become more uniform, preventing tax-savvy firms from gaining an 
advantage over other relatively more productive firms; and businesses could 
learn from one another, which would spare firms the cost of redundantly 
developing the same tax strategies.  In the long run, these efficiency gains 
could result in lower prices, higher wages, more innovation, more leisure, 
and better investment returns.  In the debate over business tax privacy, these 
sorts of economic efficiency arguments have received surprisingly little 
attention.  This Article argues that economic efficiency is central to the 
debate and may well change where we come out on business tax privacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
President Trump’s tax returns are at the center of a growing tax privacy 
controversy.1  These documents surely contain a treasure trove of 
information about President Trump’s business empire.2  If public, they would 
reveal how the Trump Organization interprets key elements of tax law, how 
it shelters its income from taxes, and how it structures some of its 
transactions—likely through a complicated network of parent, subsidiary, 
and affiliate entities.3  Of course, under current law, neither Trump’s 
individual nor his business tax returns are accessible by the public.4 
Since the 1920s, tax privacy has been the law of the land, but that is not 
to say that the wisdom of tax privacy is settled.5  Scholars have spilled much 
ink debating tax privacy, primarily focusing on corporate tax returns.6  
Defenders of corporate tax privacy have posited an inherent right to privacy,7 
voiced concerns about how corporations could lose their competitive 
advantage if forced to publish their returns,8 and predicted that eliminating 
corporate tax privacy might lead to tax shelter proliferation.9  Opponents of 
 1  Interest in President Trump’s tax returns stems from politically charged concerns that 
he has a business or foreign conflict of interest or may not be complying with tax law despite 
being the chief executive of the United States.  Erica Werner & Damian Paletta, Trump 
Defiant as Democrats Prep Push for His Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-suggests-he-wont-turn-over-tax-
returns-even-if-democrats-demand-them/2018/11/07/396ae650-e2ad-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd5 
3ca6b_story.html; Jeff Stein, House Democrats Begin Hearings on Obtaining President 
Trump’s Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2019),https://www.washingtonpost.com/business 
/2019/02/07/house-democrats-begin-hearings-getting-president-trumps-tax-returns/.  
 2  Tax privacy issues have received extraordinary attention since President Trump’s 
campaign gained traction.  See, e.g., Timothy O’Brien, A New Reason for Trump to Release 
His Tax Returns: Helsinki, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opin 
ion/articles/2018-07-17/helsinki-2018-putin-and-trump-s-tax-returns.   
 3  Some of President Trump’s 1995 tax return was leaked, showing a $916 million-dollar 
loss that could be used to offset income.  Pages from Donald Trump’s 1995 Income Tax 
Records, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/01/us/po 
litics/donald-trump-taxes.html.  
4  I.R.C. § 6103 (2019). 
5  See infra Part IA. 
6  See Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31 
(2014); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information 
Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95 (2005); David Lenter, Joel Slemrod & 
Douglas Shackelford, Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information: Accounting, 
Economics, and Legal Perspectives, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 803 (2003). 
 7  Tax Executives Institute, TEI Opposes Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Returns, 
58 TAX EXECUTIVE 241, 241 (2006) (arguing that “[p]rivacy is a core American value”). 
 8  This information includes “revenue and expense information by legal entity, 
jurisdiction, and functional category.”  Id. at 242.  
9  Blank, supra note 6, at 38.  This Article turns Blank’s argument on its head by arguing 
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corporate tax privacy have countered that public access to corporate returns 
would increase detection of illegal tax evasion,10 result in shaming of 
unethical corporate behavior,11 catalyze beneficial policy changes,12 and 
generally increase the public’s understanding of tax law.13 
The scholarship behind the corporate tax privacy debate is insightful 
but misses two key points.  First, there is little reason to focus solely on 
corporate tax returns.  Corporations comprise only a tiny fraction of US 
businesses.14  Eliminating corporate tax privacy would reveal nothing new 
about non-corporate business entities, including partnerships and LLCs, and 
thus would miss many of the benefits of eliminating business tax privacy.15  
Moreover, if only corporate returns were made public, some businesses 
that there may be economic benefits to having tax shelter proliferation and public access to 
business tax return information more broadly.  Blank focuses only on the possible effect of 
eliminating business tax privacy on government revenue, while this Article looks at the 
economy’s productivity and the efficiency of tax collection. 
 10  Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 99.  Tax evasion is the illegal underreporting of tax 
liability.  Tax avoidance is at least plausibly legal behavior designed to minimize tax liability. 
There is some evidence that tax compliance is higher for publicly traded firms and firms in 
heavily regulated industries, suggesting that non-IRS eyes can affect compliance.  Eric M. 
Rice, The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corporations, in WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 125–62 (Joel Slemrod ed. 1992).  
 11  Walgreens opted not to pursue an inversion when it merged with a foreign competitor, 
and its stock price immediately fell over fourteen percent.  Kim Hjelmgaard & Kevin McCoy, 
Walgreen’s Stock Smacked After Tax Inversion Out, USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2014, 7:13 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/08/06/walgreens-alliance-boots-
chicago/13659809/.  See also Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax 
Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter 
Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 126 (2009) (offering suggestive evidence that investors 
respond positively to tax management); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations 
and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L 
TAX J. 409, 423 (2002) (reporting that the share values of Stanley Works jumped when it 
announced plans to invert). 
 12  Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative 
Process as Illustrated by the Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990). 
E.g., Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, for example, was partially a
response to a public outcry over the number of wealthy individuals that were using shelters to
pay little or no tax.
 13  Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 103.  Many individuals, however, do not increase their 
understanding of tax law, even in cases where it is in their personal financial interest to do so.  
See Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete 
Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1 
(2015) (finding evidence that many taxpayers that are eligible for the EITC do not claim it). 
 14  Only 5% of businesses file corporate tax returns.  Corporations do, however, account 
for 62% of business receipts.  Andrew Lundeed & Kyle Pomerlau, Corporations Make up 5 
Percent of Businesses but Earn 62% of Revenues, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://taxfoundation.org/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62-percent-
revenues/. 
 15  The Trump Organization, for example, is likely comprised of mostly non-corporate 
business entities. 
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would respond by converting to non-corporate forms.16  Second, and more 
importantly, business tax privacy harms the economy.  In most tax policy 
debates, the economic efficiency of competing policies is central.17  Yet the 
business tax privacy debate has paid almost no attention to the economic 
efficiency implications of tax privacy.18 
This Article argues that eliminating business tax privacy would 
improve the allocation of economic resources by making important 
information publicly available.  This information could be put to good use in 
two ways.  First, investors could use business tax return information to build 
more accurate financial models.  Using these improved models, investors 
would direct more capital to more deserving firms.19 
Second, firms could learn from each other’s tax returns, which would 
have two benefits.20  One, it would make tax outcomes more uniform across 
firms.  Uniform tax outcomes are economically efficient because they 
prevent tax-savvy firms from having an advantage over non-tax-savvy firms.  
Economic output is maximized when investing decisions are made on the 
basis of the relative productivity of firms and not confounding factors such 
as how adept a firm is at outrunning the IRS.21  Two, if firms learned from 
each other’s tax returns, each firm would spend fewer resources developing 
its own tax strategies because each would have at least partial access to the 
strategies of all the others.  This would reduce wasteful and redundant 
expenditure, allowing businesses to spend more on wages and research or to 
pass savings on to consumers and investors.22 
These efficiencies overwhelm many of the business-centric arguments 
in favor of business tax privacy.23  While businesses lose the advantage of 
keeping their own returns private, they gain the advantage of having access 
to the universe of business tax returns.24  Being forced to disclose only its 
returns would place a business at a severe disadvantage.  Simultaneously 
gaining access to all other business returns, however, would entirely negate 
that disadvantage on average while also making tax avoidance cheaper.  
16  Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 826. 
 17  This is true in academic circles where scholars attempt to find the deadweight loss of 
taxes and is also true in political circles where putatively bad tax policies are labeled job 
killers. 
18  For the purposes of this Article, efficiency is efficiency in allocation. For a definition 
see PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 29 (3rd ed. 2013). 
19  See infra Part IIA and Part IIIB1. 
20  See infra Part IIB. 
21  See infra Part IIIB2. 
22  See infra Part IIIB3. 
23  See infra Part IIIC4. 
24  Essentially, this argument is framed in what economists would call partial equilibrium 
as opposed to general equilibrium.  They are thinking only of only one moving part but would 
come to a different conclusion were they to step back and observe the entire machine. 
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Some firms would be losers, including those that currently prevent investors 
from finding adverse information available in tax returns and those that have 
a comparative advantage in tax sheltering.  But businesses in aggregate 
would benefit. 
Before proceeding, two points merit mention.  First, these arguments 
do not depend on whether one thinks tax sheltering itself is beneficial for the 
economy as a whole.  Rather, they suggest that in a world with widespread 
tax sheltering it is better to lower the barriers that impede the flow of business 
tax information.25  This approach prevents firms that are particularly good at 
tax sheltering from having an economic advantage over firms that are not.  It 
also limits the wasteful and redundant spending on securing tax-sheltering 
advantages, while providing investors with valuable information. 
Second, this analysis only applies to businesses, and most especially to 
large businesses.  There are stronger privacy interests that warrant keeping 
the tax returns of individuals private.26  And there is little if any economic 
efficiency upside to making individual tax returns public.27 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides the necessary 
background by explaining how tax privacy came to be, the basics of business 
tax returns, and what information business tax returns contain that is nowhere 
else publicly available.  Part II shows how business tax privacy causes 
investors to experience adverse outcomes and businesses to have non-
uniform tax planning.  Part III considers the aggregate economic impact of 
adverse investor outcomes and non-uniform business tax planning, 
demonstrating the economic inefficiencies caused by business tax privacy.  
Part III also discusses the potential downsides of eliminating business tax 
privacy, including why these downsides may not outweigh the benefits.  
Finally, Part III argues that eliminating business tax privacy by changing a 
small section of the Internal Revenue Code is preferable to other more 
complicated and politically fraught solutions that might have similar 
economic benefits. 
Tax privacy has recently received an astounding volume of media 
coverage.  But while access to presidential tax returns may dominate the 
headlines, access to business tax returns generally is where we should focus 
 25  Moreover, public access to returns would decrease the returns to developing new tax 
shelters.  See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s 
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 940–50 (2010); see generally Brant J. Hellwig, 
Questioning the Wisdom of Patent Protection for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1005 
(2007). 
26  See infra Part IA and Part IB. 
 27  Greater individual income tax transparency could reduce compliance costs if 
individual taxpayers learned from one another.  Software such as TurboTax, however, has 
reduced individual taxpayer compliance costs substantially, and many of the most vexing tax 
issues on individual tax returns relate to business activities. 
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our attention. 
I. HIDDEN RETURNS
Before exploring the economic efficiency implications of business tax 
privacy, it is important to understand the information contained in business 
tax returns and the laws currently shielding these documents from public 
view.  This Part first provides a brief history of business tax privacy, noting 
the original legislative impulse to make corporate tax returns public and the 
Supreme Court cases that have held there is no constitutional right to tax 
privacy.  Then, this Part explains what business tax returns are and 
demonstrates why even the most promising sources of other information, 
namely financial statements, fall far short of providing the data available on 
business tax returns. 
A. A Brief History of Tax Privacy
Whether businesses in the United States should be entitled to tax 
privacy is a question as old as the corporate tax, and US law has answered 
this question in different ways at different times.28  In 1909, when Congress 
enacted the first incarnation of the corporate income tax (a one percent excise 
tax on corporate net income in excess of $5,000), corporate tax returns were 
intended to live in the public record and be subject to public inspection.29  
The overarching justification for the public record provision was that it 
would aid in the regulation of corporations.  Indeed, for progressives like 
President Taft, the primary appeal of the corporate income tax was not the 
additional government revenue but rather the benefits stemming from public 
access to corporate tax returns.30 
Public inspection, however, never came to be.  In 1910, the 
Commissioner of the IRS ruled that since Congress had not appropriated 
sufficient funds, the IRS was not obligated to maintain corporate tax returns 
in a searchable fashion.31  Eventually Congress did appropriate funds but 
simultaneously restricted corporate tax inspection to those authorized by 
 28  See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the 
Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).  For brief accounts of the early legislative 
history of corporate tax privacy in the United States, see Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, 
supra note 6, at 807–10; Blank, supra note 6, at 42–45.  
 29  Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 116.  The tax was an excise 
and not an income tax to avoid falling afoul of Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 
429 (1895), reh’g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (holding that the 1894 federal income tax was 
unconstitutional because the tax was not levied in proportion to each state’s population). 
 30  Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance 
Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE, 951, 976–77 (1990). 
 31  No Publicity Now in Corporation Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1910, at 1; Kornhauser, 
supra note 6, at 101.  
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order of the President.32 
The 1920s saw the tax privacy pendulum swing back and forth.  In a 
provision of the Revenue Act of 1924, Congress made the amount of income 
tax paid by individuals and corporations public information.33  Objectors—
including President Coolidge—raised privacy concerns,34 and in 1926 a 
revised revenue act mandated that only names and addresses, but not taxes 
paid, be public record.35 
The most recent legislation making tax data publicly available came in 
the early 1930s in response to a Congressional investigation that brought to 
light significant corporate tax evasion.36  Congress responded by including a 
provision in the Revenue Act of 1934 that required individuals and 
corporations to attach a pink slip to their returns.37  The pink slips were public 
information and recorded the taxpayer’s name, address, gross income, 
amount of deductions, net income, and tax liability.38  Again, objectors raised 
privacy concerns and also argued that revealing proprietary information on 
tax returns could harm corporations.39  In protest, opposed constituents sent 
fake pink slips to their Congressmen, and Congress repealed the law before 
it took effect.40 
Meanwhile, presidents retained the power to authorize the inspection of 
returns.  Some presidents, including Nixon, wielded this power as a weapon 
against political opponents.41  When the public became aware of this 
presidential abuse of power in the fallout from the Watergate scandal, 
Congress eliminated the presidential prerogative to authorize tax return 
inspection.42 
Since 1976, Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code has ensured 
that returns remain confidential with access limited to a handful of parties, 
including (1) persons with material interest, (2) certain government 
 32  Later revisions allowed shareholders to examine the returns of the corporations they 
were invested in and anyone to examine the returns of publicly traded companies, but only at 
the Commissioner’s office.  Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 126–31. 
33  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257 (b), 43 Stat. 253, 293. 
 34  These concerns applied mostly to individuals and not corporations.  In particular, 
objectors feared that the information would make it easier for criminals to kidnap or scam 
wealthy individuals.  Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: 
Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 392–94 (1993).  
35  Id. at 396–97.  
36  Id. at 398.  
37  Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698. 
38  Id. 
39  Pomp, supra note 34, at 401.  
40  Pomp, supra note 34, at 400.  
41  Mark Berggren, I.R.C. 6103: Let’s Get to the Source of the Problem, 74 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 825, 825–26 (1999). 
42  Id. 
2019] CASE AGAINST BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY 35 
employees for tax administration purposes, and (3) government agencies 
pursuing a non-tax criminal investigation.43  This confidentiality is, however, 
purely statutory.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that there is no 
constitutional right to tax privacy.44  In other words, Congress could easily 
hark back to original corporate tax law and make business tax returns public. 
Other jurisdictions entitle businesses to less tax privacy.  A few states 
currently make parts of the state corporate income tax return public, and 
property tax information is often public in the United States.45  Some 
countries make public select corporate return information, and a subset of 
these countries specifically release the identities of corporations that have 
committed fraud or other violations in reporting their tax information.46 
B. Business Tax Returns and Their Contents
If business tax returns were public, what information would be 
revealed?  The answer depends on the particular business’s legal 
classification.  For tax purposes, there are three main business types: 
corporations, partnerships, and sole-proprietorships.47 
Corporations stand apart because, in addition to having distinct tax-
reporting requirements, corporations must pay corporate income tax.48  To 
report their tax liability to the government, corporations are required to 
annually file a corporate tax return.  The mainstem of the corporate tax return 
is Form 1120, which records a corporation’s sources of income, allowable 
deductions, taxable income, tax liability, and taxes owed.  Underlying Form 
 43  The law was amended in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 
1520.  Persons with material interest are exempted in I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(D) (2012); certain 
government employees for tax administration purposes in I.R.C. § 6103(d)(2) (2012); and 
government agencies conducting criminal investigations in I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (2012). 
 44  United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378 (1925) (holding that a newspaper could print 
tax return information).  See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (noting the 
beneficial effects of the public having access to corporate tax returns and suggesting that 
government publication of tax documents did not violate the Constitution, in particular the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments).  
 45  See Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 810–813. Non-profits in the US 
are required to file Form 990 which is publicly available. 
 46  Id. Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Finland make some information public, but none of 
them make all relevant documents publicly available.  Australia has also recently changed its 
tax regime to require more public tax disclosures. Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Leslie Robinson & Joel 
Slemrod, Public Tax-return Disclosure, 66 J. ACCT & ECON 142, 142–44 (2018). 
 47  Other tax classifications include S corporations, trusts, and not-for-profit 
organizations.  S corporations are pass through entities, similar to partnerships but with 
slightly different rules.  See I.R.C. Subchapter S.  This analysis applies to them.  To the extent 
that a business could be operated through a trust or a not-for-profit organization, this analysis 
also applies to them.  
 48  Most non-corporate business organizations, including partnerships and LLCs, are not 
required to pay the corporate income tax but may elect to be treated as corporations for tax 
purposes.  Treas. Reg. § 301.77-1-3. 
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1120 are schedules that tally the corporation’s cost of goods sold, 
compensation to corporate officers, dividend income, capital gains net 
income, and depreciation, among many other tax-relevant items.49 
Beyond these basic financial items, corporations must report 
information about their domestic and foreign subsidiaries and, in some cases, 
they must document foreign ownership.50  Given that corporations may have 
hundreds or even thousands of interconnected entities, linked by complex 
affiliation structures across many different tax jurisdictions, this 
documentation may account for a substantial portion of their tax filings.  
Corporations must also file documentation flagging certain activities and 
positions that the IRS may wish to subject to additional scrutiny.51 
Unlike corporations, partnerships (which for tax purposes include 
LLCs and associations) are not subject to a separate tax.  Instead, 
partnerships are “pass-through entities” for federal tax purposes.52  All of a 
partnership’s income, deductions, and credits are recorded on Form 1065 and 
then allocated to its members, who must then include their allocation in their 
own tax computations.  Just as with corporations, several additional 
schedules underlie Schedule 1065 that record relevant partnership business 
activity. 
Sole-proprietorships also do not have a separate tax imposed on them.  
For federal tax purposes, sole-proprietorships are “disregarded entities”—
their business activity appears on the tax return of their owners.53  The 
owner’s tax return includes the relevant forms that record this activity, such 
as Schedule C, which reports the profit or loss from business, or Schedule F, 
which reports profit or loss from farming. 
The arguments in this Article in favor of eliminating business tax 
privacy apply most strongly to corporations, but there are three reasons why 
eliminating business tax privacy more broadly would be advantageous.  
First, the vast majority of businesses in the US are partnerships for tax 
purposes.54  Second, at least some corporations would consider reclassifying 
 49  Cost of goods sold is reported on Form 1125-A; compensation to corporate officers is 
reported on Form 1125-E; dividend income is reported on Schedule C; capital gains net 
income is reported in Schedule D; depreciation is reported on Form 4562.  
50  This information may be found in Form 5471. 
 51  See, e.g., the Reportable Transactions Statement, Form 8886, on which corporations 
must report certain avoidance activities; and Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax Positions, on 
which a corporation must report tax positions if that corporation either has created a financial 
reserve for that position or plans to litigate it. 
52  I.R.C. § 701.   
53  Treas. Reg. § 301.77-1-3.   
54  Only 5% of businesses file corporate tax returns.  Corporations do, however, account 
for 62% of business receipts.  Lundeed & Pomerlau, supra note 14.  
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as partnerships if only corporate tax privacy were eliminated.55  Third, there 
are business transactions that make use of both corporate and partnership 
structures to achieve favorable tax outcomes.  For these transactions, 
interested parties cannot see the whole picture without access to partnership 
returns.56 
The case for maintaining the tax privacy status quo is strongest for sole-
proprietorships and small partnerships, especially those that do not have 
limited liability.57  The tax information of these businesses would reveal 
information about the persons who owned them.58  If there were an exception 
allowing some businesses to retain tax privacy, it should only apply to simple 
companies—those that have no subsidiaries or affiliates, and are owned only 
by a small number of individuals.  Broader exceptions are too likely to be 
abused.  We should also be wary of any right that businesses have to redact 
any content from their returns prior to publication. 
For all business entities, the broadest definition of a return includes 
documents transmitted to the IRS subsequent to the initial tax filing.  These 
documents reveal the dialogue between the IRS and the taxpayer.  For 
example, if the IRS believes a business’s initial return contains errors, the 
IRS may send the business a notice of proposed adjustment to a tax return or 
proposed changes to income.  If the business agrees, it may respond with a 
form consenting to the collection of deficiencies.59  If the business does not 
55  Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 826. 
 56  See Gladriel Shobe, Supercharged IPOs and the Up-C, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 913 (2017) 
(describing several transactions that make use of corporate and partnership entities to 
minimize tax liability for the business and its owners).   
57  The case for tax privacy is far stronger for individuals than for corporations for at least 
three reasons.  First, there is a plausible public policy concern that individual tax return 
information could aid criminals interested in perpetrating various pecuniary crimes.  See 79 
CON. REC. 2690 (1935) (statement of Rep. Robert L. Bacon) (stating concern that conmen 
would use the individual return information to compile “sucker lists”).  See also Pomp, supra 
note 34, at 401; Income Publicity Called Kidnap Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1935, at 2.  Second, 
the information on an individual return would reveal far more intimate details about the 
taxpayer than business tax returns would reveal about the various stakeholders in the 
businesses.  The sensitive information might include medical expenses, marital status, and 
number of dependents.  Third, the relative availability of business financial information 
implies that social norms are less concerned with making business financial information 
available.   
 58  There are some who claim that as a first principle businesses and individuals should 
be entitled to the same rights under the law.  Tax Executives Institute, supra note 7, at 241 
(arguing that “[p]rivacy is a core American value”).  There are meaningful distinctions, 
however, between corporations and individuals that make the case for parity tenuous if not 
specious.   
 59  A notice of proposed adjustment to a tax return may be made using Form 5701; 
proposed changes to income may be made using Form 4549; consent to the collection of 
deficiencies may be made on Form 870; Form 1120X explains the changes made in an 
amended corporate return; Form 1065X explains the changes made in an amended partnership 
return; Form 1040X explains the changes made in an amended individual return.   
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agree, it may appeal to the IRS Office of Appeals and beyond that to the 
federal court system.60  If the business would like to alter its initial tax filing, 
it may file an amended return.61 
Taken together, these documents reveal a great deal about a business.  
For all businesses, they state the business’s income, deductions, and credits 
and how the business arrived at those figures.  For corporations, they also 
state the corporation’s corporate income tax liability and how that 
corporation arrived at its tax liability figure.  Moreover, these documents 
disclose business structures and transactions, including information about 
the relevant tax jurisdictions and also subsequent interactions with the IRS.  
In short, an observer would gain substantial insight into a business’s 
interpretation of tax law and that business’s tax strategies. 
C. The Value of Business Tax Returns
The information contained in business tax returns has value because no 
publicly available records contain comparable information.  No publicly 
available information sheds light on business tax planning and compliance 
strategies, explains the details of corporate tax liability, or even reveals what 
a given corporation’s tax liability is.62 
The only public documents that come close to disclosing corporate tax 
liability are the financial filings that the SEC requires of public 
corporations.63  Of course, only a small fraction of businesses are 
corporations and only a small fraction of corporations are publicly traded.64  
And even for public corporations the financial statements are a poor 
 60  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 5, YOUR APPEAL 
RIGHT AND HOW TO PREPARE A PROTEST IF YOU DON’T AGREE (1999), https://www.irs.gov/pu 
b/irs-pdf/p5.pdf. 
 61  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 556, EXAMINATION
OF RETURNS, APPEAL RIGHTS, AND CLAIMS FOR REFUND 8– 9, 11 (2013), https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/p556.pdf.  
 62  There is no such thing as non-corporate business tax liability because the tax relevant 
items of a business are allocated to its owners.   
 63  See 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2016) (outlining additional details about the filing requirements 
of public corporations).  The financial statements do include changes in deferred tax assets 
and liabilities, a global effective tax rate, net operating losses, permanently reinvested 
earnings, and penalties and material risks.  Blank, supra note 6, at 45–48; Michelle Hanlon, 
What Can We Infer About a Firm’s Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements, 56 NAT.
TAX J. 831, 838 (2003).  In extreme cases, financial reporting requires some reconciliation 
between the financial statements and the tax return, but even the reconciliation’s numbers 
may be aggregated to the point of uselessness.  Hanlon, supra, at 837.  Most firms use the 
indirect method for their Statement of Cash Flows, in which case the financial statements will 
not reveal cash taxes paid.   
 64  Mary Ellen Biery, 4 Things You Don’t Know About Private Companies, FORBES (May 
26, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/2013/05/26/4-things-you-dont-know-
about-private-companies/#556e49dd291a.   
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substitute for corporate tax returns for at least three reasons.65  First, financial 
statements and tax returns are prepared under very different accounting 
rules.66  Examples of differences include that the financial statements have 
different standards for consolidation,67 are only required to show tax 
information for continuing operations,68 and expense stock options as they 
vest.69 
Second, in most instances, discretion in disclosure rules makes it 
difficult to infer exactly what the financial statement numbers mean and how 
they relate to the tax return information.70  Scholars who have compared 
corporations with similar business activities have found large discrepancies 
between how those activities were accounted for on the financial statements 
and on tax returns.71 
Third, the two sets of documents are unlikely to be prepared at the same 
time because the 10-K is due ninety days after the end of a firm’s fiscal 
year,72 whereas the tax return need not be filed until eight and a half months 
have elapsed.73  Thus when the financial statements are released, the tax 
return liability need not even have been computed. 
These differences matter.  Regression analysis has shown a significant 
disparity between financial statement and tax return numbers.74  On average, 
for every dollar of current tax expense on the financial statement, there is 
 65  See Hanlon, supra note 63, at 831; Petro Lisowsky, Inferring U.S. Tax Liability from 
Financial Statement Information, 31 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 29 (2009).   
 66  This is not surprising.  The financial statements apply Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) to present information in a way that will help interested parties make 
financial decisions.  The corporate tax return records the information necessary to determine 
tax liability.   
 67  Hanlon, supra note 63, at 845–46.  Under Financial Accounting Standard 94, firms are 
required to consolidate financial statements for any subsidiaries they control and report 
income from any subsidiaries they have at least a 20% ownership interest in.  Under I.R.C. § 
1504 consolidation may be elected if the ownership interest in the subsidiary is at least 80%.  
Thus, ownership stakes of between 20% and 80% may lead to different incomes due to 
consolidation.  For tax purposes, income is recognized when there is a dividend paid under 
I.R.C. § 862.
68  See Hanlon, supra note 63, at 843.
 69  Hanlon, supra note 63, at 839.  Corporations may claim a deduction for employee 
stock options when they are exercised under I.R.C. § 422.   
 70  Hanlon, supra note 63, at 836.  For example, the provision for uncertain tax positions 
should accrue probable tax losses and note possible tax losses, but the financial statements 
are often opaque with regard to these reserves.  Id at 842. There is evidence that the 
requirement that firms disclose these tax reserves led more firms to settle with the IRS. 
Jennifer L. Blouin, Cristi A. Gleason, Lillian Mills & Stephanie A. Sikes, Pre-empting 
Disclosure? Firms’ Decisions Prior to FIN No. 48, 85 ACCT REV. 791 (2010).  
71  Lisowsky, supra note 65, at 29. 
 72  In some cases, less than 90 days after the end of a firm’s fiscal year.  17 C.F.R. § 
210.3-01 (2016).  
73  I.R.C. § 6072(d).  See also Hanlon, supra note 63, at 835. 
74  Lisowsky, supra note 65, at 30.   
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only seventy cents of tax liability on the corporate tax return.75  Anyone who 
had access to financial statements, but not corporate tax returns, could at best 
make a poor guess at that corporation’s tax liability. 
More importantly, a business tax return reveals how a business interacts 
with tax law.  It sheds light on how a business decides to comply with the 
requirements of tax law, how a business strategically plans its structures and 
activities to minimize its tax liability, and how well that business executes 
its compliance and planning strategies.76  Without access to business tax 
returns, any interested party will not understand business tax compliance and 
planning strategies and the execution of those strategies. 
In sum, for most businesses, no tax-related information is publicly 
available.  For the small fraction of corporations that are publicly traded, an 
interested party would be able to find financial statement tax liability—a 
poor proxy for the actual tax liability stated on returns.  And even with this 
poor proxy, the interested party would not be able to meaningfully infer 
much about a business’s tax planning and compliance strategies. 
II. HIDDEN COSTS
The previous Part showed that a great deal could be learned from 
business tax returns.  But if business tax returns were made public, who 
would use return information, how would they use it, and what ultimately 
would the impact of that usage be?  This Part looks at how two groups could 
use business tax returns.  Part IIA explains how investors could use business 
tax return information to improve their financial models.  Part IIB explores 
how firms could use business tax return information from other firms to 
improve their tax compliance and planning.  The fact that investors and firms 
do not have access to business tax returns causes both of these groups to 
suffer adverse outcomes and results in businesses having non-uniform tax 
compliance and planning.  This analysis sets the stage for the discussion in 
Part III about the widespread benefits of eliminating business tax privacy. 
A. Suboptimal Investing
This Subpart first shows how investors use information to forecast the 
future risks and returns of their investments.  It then demonstrates how more 
detailed business activity information would materially improve these 
forecasts.  This Subpart concludes by arguing that without business tax return 
information, investors will make suboptimal investing decisions. 
75  Id. 
 76  Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 35 
(2014). 
2019] CASE AGAINST BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY 41 
1. Investing Decisions
The literature on investor behavior is extensive, and at its heart lies 
portfolio theory.77  Portfolio theory explores how investors allocate their 
money, often called capital, across different investments.78  The fundamental 
objective of any investment is the money that investment pays out, often 
called (confusingly for our purposes) a return.  All other things equal, 
investors prefer a higher return to a lower return.  Returns are, however, not 
the only consideration.  Investments also vary in their risk.79  Thus investors 
must weigh the risk and return of each investment opportunity before 
deciding which ones are best. 
One possible approach to simultaneously considering the risk and 
return of an investment entails the investor adjusting the return of each 
investment by a factor that accounts for the risk.80  This adjustment depends 
on the preferences of the investor—some will accept more risk to increase 
their return and others will not.  After this adjustment, investors should aim 
to allocate their capital to maximize these risk-adjusted returns. 
The pursuit of better risk-adjusted returns explains most investing 
behavior, from a hedge fund buying distressed debt at a discount hoping to 
collect through the courts, to an individual investor picking a few stocks as 
a hobby.  Investors will have different beliefs about what will happen in the 
market, vary in the sophistication of their methods, and span the wealth 
distribution, but all are attempting to maximize their returns after adjusting 
for risk.81 
What makes investing challenging is that no one knows what the future 
performance of a business will be.  A business that performed well last year 
 77  See generally Harry M. Markowitz, The Early History of Portfolio Theory: 1600-
1960, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 5 (1999); Hal Varian, A Portfolio of Nobel Laureates: Markowitz, 
Miller and Sharpe, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993).  
 78  This literature has produced several intricate and influential mathematical models.  
See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under 
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN., 425 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risky Assets and 
the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 13 (1965); Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); HAL VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 371–76 (3rd ed. 1992). 
 79  There are many ways to measure risk.  Common metrics include standard deviation 
and market beta.  Whereas every investor prefers higher returns, attitudes towards risk can 
vary.  When selecting investments, investors may have to tradeoff between risk and return.  A 
typical investor will require a higher return to take on greater risk, but for the same increase 
in risk different investors might require different increases in return.  Varian, supra note 77, 
at 177. 
 80  This adjustment will depend on the risk preferences of the investor.  Risk-averse 
investors require a higher return to take on greater risk; risk-seeking investors will bear a 
lower return for access to greater risk.  Id.  
81   Varian, supra note 77, at 190.  The exception is a risk-neutral investor, who is 
indifferent to risk. 
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may perform poorly this year and vice-versa.82  Thus, before investors can 
optimize their portfolios, they must estimate the risk and return associated 
with each investment.  This entails forecasting the range of possible 
outcomes for a business and the likelihood of each outcome.  Sophisticated 
investors make these estimations using analytical methods and high-
performance computers.  Other investors may simply have a gut feeling 
about a particular stock, which while informal is still a forecast.  But before 
making an investment, all investors have a belief about that investment’s 
future performance—its risk and return. 
2. Information Needs
The beliefs that investors have about an investment’s future 
performance do not simply appear to the investor out of thin air.  Forecasting 
future risks and returns requires information.  The information could range 
from a firm’s past financial statements, to management interviews, to an 
overheard conversation on a subway, to a broadcast of Jim Cramer’s Mad 
Money television show.  At one extreme, an investor might have insider 
information.  At the other extreme, an investor might know little more than 
a stock’s ticker symbol.  Just as importantly, investors vary in their ability to 
use information.  Some have intricate computer models, some are trained 
Form 10-K readers, and some have neither specialized equipment nor 
training.  Without information, investors cannot make forecasts—even 
informal ones.83 
To explore how more information could improve an investor’s forecast 
of future returns, consider the following series of examples.  An investor 
observes that GM earned $100 in 2016 and $140 in 2017, as shown in the 
table below. 
 82  Past performance is no guarantee of future performance.  See generally, BURTON G. 
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR 
SUCCESSFUL INVESTING (9th ed. 2007).  Of course, the arguments in this Article assume 
investing returns are not entirely random and that information can improve investing 
strategies. 
 83  More information is not necessarily better.  Misinformation is unlikely to improve an 
investor’s decisions and even good information could result in information overload.  See, 
e.g., Julie R. Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and Information Overload: The
Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57
(2005) (looking at how information overload affects the decision to accept the default option
in retirement plans).  Not every investor, however, need use information correctly to improve
investment allocation—a critical mass of investors will suffice.
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The investor is considering investing in GM and decides to forecast GM’s 
2018 income to see if GM would be a profitable investment.84  Given that 
GM’s income grew by 40% from 2016 and 2017, a simple but reasonable 
predictive model would forecast that GM’s income will again grow 40% 
from 2017 to 2018.85  In that case, the investor would forecast an income of 
$196 for GM in 2018.86 
Now assume that the investor has additional information about GM as 
in the table below.  In addition to seeing GM’s income, the investor can see 
GM’s sales, manufacturing costs, and rent.  GM’s income is equal to its sales 
less its manufacturing costs and rent: $100 in 2016 and $140 in 2017, just as 
in the limited information scenario. 
Again, the investor would like to forecast GM’s 2018 income, now using this 
additional information.  The investor can see that in both years 
manufacturing costs as a percentage of sales were 20% and rent was fixed at 
 84  For simplicity, this example assumes that the income of the business entity is the 
income of the investor.  A more complete analysis would take into consideration all the ways 
in which investors can profit from businesses, including capital gains, dividends, and share 




= 40%. These examples assume growth rates remain the same. 
Presumably a sophisticated investor’s forecast would apply mean reversion and other 
principles to arrive at a superior forecast.  The basic point made in these examples holds 
nonetheless. 
86  $140 + $140 × 40% = $196. 
GM limited information 
Year  2016  2017 Forecast 
Income $100 $140 $196 
GM additional information version 1 
Year  2016  2017 Forecast 
Sales $500 $550 $605 
Manufacturing Costs -100 -110 -121
Rent -300 -300 -300
Income $100 $140 $184 
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$300.87  The investor can also observe that sales grew by 10% between 2016 
and 2017 and can use that information to make a more sophisticated income 
forecast by assuming that sales continue to grow at 10%, the cost of 
manufacturing as a percentage of sales remains constant at 20%, and rent 
remains $300.88  Under those assumptions, the investor would forecast 2018 
sales of $605,89 manufacturing costs of $121,90 and rent of $300.  Finally, by 
subtracting manufacturing costs and rent from sales, the investor would 
arrive at a forecast of $184 for 2018 income.91 
The additional information allowed the investor to distinguish between 
fixed and variable costs.  The investor had evidence that rent stayed fixed 
even as sales grew, but manufacturing costs grew in proportion to sales.  The 
first 2018 income forecast, $196, would imply at least one of the following: 
(1) sales growth increased, (2) the cost of manufacturing cars decreased, or
(3) the rent decreased.92  Since there is no basis for any of those assumptions,
the second forecast is likely better.93
Being able to distinguish between fixed and variable costs is not the 
only benefit that arises from having access to more detailed information.  To 
see why, consider a different additional information scenario, as shown in 
the table below, in which the investor observes that GM had one-time lawsuit 
income of $80 in 2017.  GM’s recurring income is equal to its sales less its 
manufacturing costs and rent: $100 in 2016 and $60 in 2017, but GM also 
has the lawsuit income in 2017.  Taking the lawsuit income into account, 












= 10% is the rate of sales growth. 
89  $550 + $550 × 10% = $605. 
90  $605 × 20% = $121. 
91  $605 − $121 − $300 = $184. 
92  Assuming no other sources of income or cost. 
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Again, the investor would like to forecast GM’s 2018 income.  The investor 
can see that in both years manufacturing costs as a percentage of sales were 
20% and rent was fixed at $300.94  Now, the investor observes that sales fell 
10% between 2016 and 2017 and can use that information to make a more 
sophisticated income forecast by assuming that sales continue to fall at 10%, 
the cost of manufacturing as a percentage of sales remains constant at 20%, 
and rent remains at $300.95  Under those assumptions, the investor would 
forecast 2018 sales of $405,96 manufacturing costs of $81,97 and rent of $300.  
Finally, by subtracting manufacturing costs and rent from sales, the investor 
would arrive at a forecast of $24 for 2018 income.98 
The additional information allowed the investor to distinguish between 
recurring and non-recurring income.  GM’s total income did grow between 
2016 and 2017, but that was only because it received one-time lawsuit 
income in 2017.  Its recurring income was in fact decreasing, but this would 
have not have been apparent without the additional information. 
In all three examples, GM’s 2016 and 2017 income was the same.  Yet, 
in each example, the forecasted 2018 income was very different.  More 
information changed the forecast, likely making it more accurate.  In the first 
additional information scenario, the improvement came from forecasting 
more elements forward—being able to distinguish between fixed costs and 
variable costs.  In the second additional information scenario, the 











= −10% is the rate of sales growth (or decline in this case). 
96  $450 − $450 × 10% = $405. 
97  $405 × 20% = $81. 
98  $405 − $81 − $300 = $24. 
GM additional information version 2 
Year  2016  2017 Forecast 
Sales $500 $450 $405 
Manufacturing Costs -100 -90 -81
Rent -300 -300 -300
Recurring income $100 $60 $24 
Lawsuit income +0 +80 +0
Total income $100 $140 $24 
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recurring items.  These examples used fairly simple forecasting methods, but 
the same theory applies to more intricate models.  More relevant, accurate 
information used appropriately will yield better forecasts. 
The above examples focused on forecasting income, but more 
information also improves the estimates of all financial measures, including 
risk.  Measuring risk is more involved because it requires forecasting 
multiple possible future outcomes and also estimating how likely each of 
those possible future outcomes is.  More information would make it easier 
to determine what these possible future outcomes might be and also their 
likelihood.  For example, more information about all of GM’s car product 
lines would allow an investor to forecast how the price of oil would affect 
each of its products.  The investor could then determine how much GM 
would benefit from declining oil prices or be harmed by increasing oil prices, 
ultimately using that information to estimate GM’s risk related to the price 
of oil. 
3. Tax Information
Additional tax information is no different: it would improve investors’ 
estimates of the risks and returns associated with different investments.  Tax 
return information would make it easier to forecast future tax liability and it 
would also provide otherwise unobservable data that would aid in the 
forecasting of sales, costs, and many other relevant financial measures.  
Similarly, tax return information would help an investor uncover how risky 
the tax strategies of a business are, and it would also make it easier to 
estimate many other risks. 
Tax information would be particularly useful for investors that invest 
in publicly traded corporations, a roughly $30 trillion market.99  When an 
investor is interested in investing in a small LLC, that LLC might well allow 
the investor to review its tax returns.  An investor making a similar request 
of Facebook would be ignored.  Investors of modest means may benefit 
disproportionally from eliminating business tax privacy because they tend to 
invest heavily in publicly traded equities.100 
Estimating future tax liability comes with its own challenges because a 
medley of interrelated factors determines a corporation’s tax liability.  Some 
corporations with low effective tax rates today will have low effective tax 
rates in the future.  For example, firms in industries that have easy access to 
tax credits and deductions will have lower effective tax rates today and 
 99  WORLD BANK DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end= 
2018&locations=US&start=2010&view=chart (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).  
 100  Even if investors of modest means do not understand how to use tax return information 
in their investing, they may invest in mutual funds that do.  
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tomorrow.101  This also applies to firms that can consistently use effective 
tax sheltering strategies, especially multinational firms that can shift 
business activity to lower tax jurisdictions.102  In contrast, firms that have 
abnormally large deductions and credits today will have different effective 
tax rates tomorrow.  This is especially true for firms that find ways of 
frontloading their deduction claims, which causes not only an unusually low 
tax liability today, but also an unusually high tax liability tomorrow. 
The following examples demonstrate some of the ways that tax 
information could improve investor forecasts.  An investor observes that 
Apple earned $80 in 2016 and $120 in 2017, as shown in the table below. 
The investor is considering investing in Apple and decides to forecast 
Apple’s 2018 income to see if Apple would be a profitable investment.  
Given that Apple’s income grew by 50% from 2016 to 2017, it would be 
reasonable to assume that Apple’s income will again grow 50% from 2017 
to 2018.103  In that case, the investor would forecast an income of $180 for 
Apple in 2018.104 
Now assume that the investor has additional information about Apple.  
As in the table below, the investor also sees Apple’s pre-tax income, its tax 
liability, and its 2017 retirement plan startup tax credit of $5.105  Apple’s 
after-tax income is equal to its pre-tax income less its taxes, plus any credits: 
$80 in 2016 and $120 in 2017, just as in the limited information scenario. 
101  These businesses include those engaged in qualified research and development (I.R.C. 
§ 41) and oil exploration (I.R.C. § 45I).
102  The shifting of income to low-tax jurisdictions is often called “base erosion and profit
shifting” or “BEPS” for short.  See OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 




= 50%.  These examples assume growth rates remain the same.  Presumably 
a sophisticated investor’s forecast would apply mean reversion and other principles to arrive 
at a superior forecast.  The basic point made in these examples holds nonetheless. 
104  $120 + $120 × 50% = $180. 
 105  I.R.C. § 45E.  Eligible employers may claim a credit of up to 50% of the qualified 
start-up costs of an employer provided pension using Form 8881.  This credit is only available 
to small businesses, so Apple would probably not qualify.   
Apple limited information 
Year 2016 2017 Forecast 
After-tax income $80 $120 $180 
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Again, the investor would like to forecast Apple’s 2018 income.  Now, the 
investor observes that pre-tax income grew by 60% between 2016 and 
2017.106  Assuming that income before taxes continued to grow at a 60% 
percent rate, Apple’s 2018 pre-tax income would be $256,107 Apple’s tax 
would be $64,108 and Apple’s after-tax income would be $192.109  The 
additional information changed the forecast, making it more accurate, 
because it allowed the investor to separate the recurring and non-recurring 
portions of taxes owed.110 
In the Apple example, the investor observed something about the 
company from its tax information that would likely not be available on its 
Form 10-K: Apple is creating a retirement plan.  With a more sophisticated 
financial model, the investor could also use this information to improve 
forecasts by considering Apple’s ability to recruit good employees—
presumably the retirement plan will be attractive to potential employees—
and the increased costs associated with operating the retirement plan.111 
Tax information can also improve forecasts of non-tax items, such as 
sales, as demonstrated in the following example.  An investor observes that 
Disney earned $185 in 2016 and $184 in 2017, as shown in the table below. 
106 $160−$100
$100
= 60% is the rate of pre-tax income growth. 
107   $160 + $160 × 60% = $256. 
108  $256 × 25% = $64. 
109  $256 − $64 = $192. 




 111  Some investors do take this information into account.  For example, the Parnassus 
Endeavor Fund invests in companies with “outstanding workplaces.”  PARNASSUS 
INVESTMENTS 8 (2015), https://cdn.parnassus.com/downloads/funds/ParnassusFundsBrochur 
e.pdf.
Apple additional information 
Year 2016 2017 Forecast 
Pre-tax income $100 $160 $256 
25% Corporate tax liability -25 -40 -64
Retirement plan startup credit +5 +0 +0
After-tax income $80 $120 $192 
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The investor is considering investing in Disney and decides to forecast 
Disney’s 2018 income to determine whether Disney would be a profitable 
investment.  Given that Disney’s income decreased by approximately .5% 
from 2016 to 2017, it would be reasonable to assume that Disney’s income 
will again decrease by approximately .5% from 2017 to 2018.112  In that case, 
the investor would forecast an income of $183 for Disney in 2018.113 
Now assume the investor has additional information about Disney.114  
As in the table below, the investor sees Disney’s pre-tax income and the taxes 
Disney paid to California and Florida.  Disney’s after-tax income is equal to 
its pre-tax income less its taxes: $185 in 2016 and $184 in 2017, just as in 
the limited information scenario. 
The investor can use this additional information to deduce how much of 
Disney’s income was in California and how much was in Florida. 
As shown in the table below, because the California tax rate is 10% and 
Disney paid $10 in California taxes in 2016 and $12 in California taxes in 
2017, the investor can deduce California income: $100 in 2016 and $120 in 





113  $184 − $184 × .5% = $183, rounded to the nearest integer. 
 114  For simplicity, assume also that the only costs Disney incurs are the state corporate 
taxes. 
115  10% of $100 is $10, so California income must be $100 in 2016; 10% of $120 is $12, 
so California income must be $120 in 2017. 
Disney limited information 
Year  2016 2017 Forecast 
After-tax income $185 $184 $183 
Disney additional information 
Year  2016 2017 
Pre-tax income $200 $200 
10% California tax -10 -12
5% Florida tax -5 -4
After-tax income $185 $184 
50 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:27 
and $80 in 2017.116 
The investor can find separate growth rates for California and Florida 
income.  From 2016 to 2017, California income grew by 20% and Florida 
income fell by 20%.117  Assuming that California income continues to grow 
at the same rate of 20%, it will be $144 in 2018.118  Assuming that Florida 
income continues to decline at the same rate of 20%, it will be $64 in 2018.119  
At those income levels, 2018 California taxes will be $14.4 and 2018 Florida 
taxes will be $3.2.120  Thus, the projected total income for 2018 will be 
$190.4.121 
The additional information improved the investor’s 2018 forecast of tax 
liability and also allowed the investor to compute two separate income 
growth rates, which would likely be more accurate than computing one 
company-wide income growth rate.122  Perhaps even more importantly, the 
investor gained additional understanding of Disney’s strategy regarding 
where it plans to expand its business.123 
The examples thus far have focused on the investor’s forecast of future 
income, but tax information can also inform investors about the risks 
associated with investing in a corporation.  As a final example, consider an 
 116  5% of $100 is $5, so Florida income must be $100 in 2016; 5% of $80 is $4, so Florida 








118  $120 + $120 × 20% = $144. 
119  $80 − $80 × 20% = $64. 
120  $144 × 10% = $14.4 and $64 × 5% = $3.2. 
121  $144 − $14.4 + $64 − $3.2 = $190.4. 




 123  Disney’s competitors will also have access to this information.  See infra Part IIIC2 
for further analysis of this issue. 
Disney additional information 
Year  2016 2017 Forecast 
California income $100 $120 $144.0 
Florida income 100 80 64.0 
Pre-tax income $200 $200 $208.0 
10% California tax -10 -12 -14.4
5% Florida tax -5 -4 3.2
After-tax income $185 $184 $190.4 
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investor who observes, as shown in the table below, that Google had pre-tax 
income of $100 in both 2016 and 2017; taxes of $25 in 2016 and $20 in 2017; 
and, thus, after-tax income of $75 in 2016 and $80 in 2017. 
The investor observes that Google’s effective tax rate was 25% in 2016 
but only 20% in 2017.124  Given only this information, the investor will not 
know why the effective tax rate decreased from 2016 to 2017.  If the investor 
cannot see why Google’s effective tax rate changed, the investor will have a 
worse estimate of Google’s future tax liability and a worse estimate of 
Google’s future tax risk. 
With more information, the investor could understand what the 
decrease in effective tax rate implies for Google’s future.  The decreased 
effective tax rate in 2017 would, for example, have different return and risk 
implications if it were caused by a one-time credit as opposed to Google 
adopting a risky tax avoidance strategy.  If the 2017 effective tax rate were 
smaller because of a one-time credit, then 25% is probably a better 
approximation of Google’s future tax rate.  If the lower effective tax rate 
were caused by a risky tax avoidance strategy, which the IRS would likely 
contest, then the best approximation of Google’s future tax rate would 
depend on the probability that Google prevails over the IRS and the penalties 
Google would face if it did not prevail.  With a risky tax avoidance strategy, 
the best forecast of Google’s tax rate might be lower than 25%, but investing 
in Google would also carry more risk because the outcome of the possible 
dispute with IRS would be uncertain. 
The utility of tax return information to investors is not merely 
theoretical.  In practice, the absence of tax information causes analysts to 
arrive at vastly different valuations for the same company—differences that 







 125  Morris Pearl, How Companies Like Apple Dodge Taxes and Their Own Investors, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/opinion/how-companies-like-
apple-dodge-taxes-and-their-own-investors.html (describing how two analysts came up with 
valuations $28 billion dollars apart for Dell, despite using similar methods, largely because 
Google limited information 
Year 2016 2017 
Pre-tax income $100 $100 
Corporate income tax liability -25 -20
After-tax income $75 $80 
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not contain much information about the riskiness of tax strategies, it is 
impossible to tell in most cases if a firm’s effective tax rate is low because 
of a credit or a tax shelter.126  Investors remain in the dark. 
B. Suboptimal Business Tax Planning and Compliance
Investors are not the only ones that would eagerly scrutinize business 
tax returns.  Businesses would also be keen to take a look.  This Subpart 
considers the effect of eliminating business tax privacy on firms. It first 
shows how even similar firms will have different tax outcomes because (1) 
firms have different tax strategies, (2) firms make different judgments about 
how to record tax-relevant transactions, and (3) some firms are more inclined 
to err in their accounting than others.  This Subpart then shows how public 
access to returns would allow firms to compare their returns to other firms, 
enabling each firm to find the best tax strategies, apply most appropriate tax-
relevant judgments, and catch accounting errors.  Ultimately, the flow of tax 
information between firms would make tax compliance and planning more 
uniform across firms.  Without access to business tax returns, businesses will 
have disparate tax outcomes, which will cause economic distortions that are 
discussed in Part III. 
1. Variation in Business Tax Outcomes
Under the Internal Revenue Code, business activities receive different 
tax treatment based on the location, timing, and character of those activities.  
For example, investment in opportunity zones, research and development 
expenses, and qualified oil and gas production all receive favorable tax 
treatment.127 
Even identical businesses, however, subject to the same laws, prepare 
substantially different returns.  In an annual experiment, Money Magazine 
consistently found that different tax experts given the same information 
prepared substantially different tax returns.128  This should come as no 
they made different assumptions about the company’s overseas taxes). There is also evidence 
that firms facing tax uncertainty delay large capital investments. Martin Jacob, Kelly 
Wentland & Scott Wentland, Real Effects of Tax Uncertainty: Evidence from Firm Capital 
Investments (Apr. 11, 2019) (working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst 
ract_id-2518243. That information would certainly be valuable to investors. 
126  Hanlon, supra note 63, at 844. 
 127  Businesses that invest in opportunity zones, I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018), have qualified 
research and development costs, § 41, and produce oil or gas from marginal wells, § 45I, are 
entitled to favorable tax treatment. 
128  JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 229 (5th ed. 2017) (citing several 
studies from Money Magazine).  See also Joel Slemrod, The Costs of Tax Complexity: 
Presentation to the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Return 5 (March 3, 2005). 
See, e.g., Lisa De Simone, John R. Robinson & Bridget Stomberg, Distilling the Reserve for 
Uncertain Tax Positions: The Revealing Case of Black Liquor, 19 REV. ACCOUNT STUD. 456 
2019] CASE AGAINST BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY 53 
surprise.  Tax compliance and planning are neither trivial nor perfunctory.  
Firms must record and categorize the multitudinous tax-relevant transactions 
they execute every day.  Moreover, the size of the tax code combined with 
its opaque nature renders compliance hardly a simple matter of course.129  
When the incentive to minimize tax liability is added to the mix, actualized 
by tax practitioners of varying skill and moral fiber, we should be surprised 
whenever two businesses do manage to have the same effective tax rate,130 
let alone the same tax strategies. 
If, however, business tax returns were public, every firm could compare 
its tax return to other firms’ returns.  Whenever a firm found discrepancies, 
it could take a close look, learn from the discrepancy, and if advantageous 
modify its tax planning and compliance strategy and execution. 
2. Firm Learning
There are many ways to categorize the causes of disparate business tax 
outcomes.131  This section describes three (strategy, discretion, and error) 
and explains how eliminating business tax privacy and allowing firms to 
learn from one another would reduce disparate business tax outcomes.132 
Strategy.  The Internal Revenue Code creates many opportunities for 
businesses to decrease their tax liability with careful tax planning.  Common 
legal strategies to reduce tax liability include manipulating the timing of 
transactions, strategically structuring business transactions, preferring 
(2014) (detailing how nineteen corporations accounted for a refundable excise tax credit in 
very different ways); Rice, supra note 10, at 125–62 (estimating the distribution of tax 
mistakes that small firms make).  
 129  The US government itself seems unsure of how long the Code is: “The tax code has 
grown so long that it has become challenging even to figure out how long it is.  A search of 
the Code conducted using the ‘word count’ feature in Microsoft Word turned up nearly four 
million words.”  TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 1 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (2012), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf.  
130  The simplest way to think about tax variation is as variation in effective tax rates. 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 =  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
.  Using ETRs (which are average rates) simplifies the 
analysis and captures the essential intuition.  The complete picture is much more complicated. 
In theory, the marginal rate should drive decision making in the primary market for capital, 
but the average rate should drive decision making in the secondary market for capital.  Further 
complicating matters, because most investments yield returns over several periods, there are 
in fact several marginal tax and average tax rates that may be relevant.  
 131  One possible partition is error, avoidance, evasion, discretion, and chance.  These are 
not always clearly defined and distinct, but the following demarcations offer a starting point: 
error and chance are unintentional, but error requires that available information is neglected 
or misused; avoidance and evasion are intentional; avoidance is at least plausibly legal; 
evasion requires concealing information from the tax authority and is illegal; and judgment 
implies that reasonable minds could differ on, for example, the correct application of law or 
the correct forecast of a financial item. 
132  Part IIIB2 infra discusses why this is beneficial for the economy at large. 
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certain forms of financing, and shifting income to more tax-favorable 
jurisdictions.133  Many of these strategies require complex transactions and 
an intricate network of affiliated business entities.  Some of these strategies 
are legal, some are illegal, and some fall into a grey area, in which the IRS 
and a firm (or even different firms) might disagree about a particular 
application of tax law.134 
While many of these strategies are widely understood, the devil is in 
the details, and it would be a mistake to assume that business tax strategy is 
uniform across firms.  Indeed, some corporations are well known to be more 
effective at tax planning than others.  For many years, GE’s tax department 
employed nearly 1,000 people and was called the world’s best tax law 
firm.135  Moreover, while many of the largest corporations have access to the 
same cadre of accounting and law firms, many smaller businesses do not.136  
 133  Stock repurchases and dividend payments both return capital to investors.  These two 
transactions, however, are not identical from the perspective of the investors for tax purposes. 
Repurchases may trigger capital gains taxes and dividends may trigger dividend taxes—
depending on the situation, one may be preferred to the other.  Toward the end of a tax year, 
it may be advantageous to shift revenue recognition from the coming year to the current one 
if rates are expected to be higher in the following year.  Interest from debt obligations may be 
deductible, but dividend payments are not.  I.R.C. § 163 (2018).  From a corporate tax 
standpoint, using debt instead of equity financing is thus an avoidance activity.  Because 
equity has non-tax advantages, there are financial advisors that design instruments that 
resemble debt for tax purposes and equity for non-tax purposes.  
 134  A typical example is transfer pricing, especially when intellectual property is involved.  
Microsoft, for example, sold intellectual property to a subsidiary in a lower tax jurisdiction.  
The subsidiary then used the intellectual property to generate profit.  The original sale was 
subject to US taxes and the subsequent profit was subject to foreign tax law (until the 
subsidiary pays a dividend to Microsoft).  The price of the original sale effectively determined 
the allocation of taxable income between these two jurisdictions.  Although there was 
uncertainty over the value of the intellectual property, Microsoft had a strong incentive to 
estimate the value to be as small as possible.  Even though the profits belong to the subsidiary, 
they may be loaned to the parent company for periods less than 60 days.  Rolling over these 
loans, HP, for example, was able to effectively repatriate billions.  Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
The Price Isn’t Right, THE ECONOMIST: THE SCHUMPETER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/schumpeter/2012/09/21/the-price-isnt-right. 
 135  David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html.  The 
claim that GE paid no taxes was sensationalized by the press and some politicians.  Robert 
Farley, Warren: GE Pays No Taxes, FACT CHECK (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.factcheck.org 
/2012/04/warren-ge-pays-no-taxes/.  GE paid no taxes because it sustained an enormous loss 
from the collapse of GE Capital during the Great Recession.  See, e.g., Allan Sloan, The Truth 
About GE’s Tax Bill, FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2011/04/04/the-
truth-about-ges-tax-bill/.  GE has recently fallen on harder times and has slashed the number 
of tax professionals it employees.  Neil Amato, 600 Tax Professionals Moving to PWC, J. 
ACCOUNTANCY (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2017/jan/pwc-
to-add-ge-tax-team-201715836.html. 
 136  The four largest accounting firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young and KPMG, are collectively known as the “Big Four.”  Michael 
Rapoport, Big Four Accounting Firms’ Revenue Rise 10.4%, Strongest Growth in Years, 
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Thus, although there is variation in tax strategy between similarly sized 
firms, the variation across all firms (from those with the most innovative tax 
planning to those with little or none at all) is far more substantial. 
With public access to returns, firms could learn about the tax strategies 
of other firms.  They could reverse engineer some of the compliance, 
sheltering, and preparation decisions of other firms.137  In particular, they 
could learn about each other’s inter-party transactions,138 see which activities 
and jurisdictions other firms are using for tax sheltering purposes, and learn 
about transfer pricing arrangements.139  By looking at the documents filed 
with the IRS subsequent to the original return, firms could also learn about 
what the IRS contests and what it does not and modify their tax strategies 
accordingly.140  As each firm applied what it learned from other firms, tax 
strategies would become more uniform across firms. 
Discretion.  Complying with tax law requires firms to make many 
judgment calls.  The Internal Revenue Code is filled with ambiguities, and 
tax cases often point taxpayers in different directions.141  Businesses may, 
for example, expense bad debts, but deciding what proportion of debts will 
be uncollectable is not an exact science and reasonable minds may differ.142  
Business taxpayers also use discretion with non-substantive issues, such as 
what to disclose to the IRS. 
In the long run, many judgments are overridden.  Accountants must 
guess in the financial statements what fraction of debts that will not be 
collected, but that estimate will ultimately be replaced by the actual fraction 
of debts that the business is unable to collect.  Similarly, accountants must 
guess how a dispute with the IRS will be resolved, but ultimately that 
forecast will be replaced by the actual outcome of the dispute. 
Nonetheless, variation in discretion could make two otherwise similar 
firms appear very different in a given year.  Consider, for example, two firms 
that were identical except for their accounting practices, with the more 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-four-accounting-firms-
revenue-rises-10-4-strongest-growth-in-years-11544713625.  
 137  See supra Part IIB and Part IIC; Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 821; 
Blank, supra note 6, at 62–69. 
138  Blank, supra note 6, at 90. 
139  Id. at 91.  
140  Id. at 94–95.  
141  For example, the IRS has the authority to reclassify debt as equity.  I.R.C. § 385 
(2018).  The Internal Revenue Code and accompanying regulations contain several 
ambiguities, so Common Law standards have emerged from the various cases dealing with 
reclassification.  These Common Law standards, however, are not uniformly applied, and in 
many plausible cases a taxpayer may not have much certainty about the likelihood of 
reclassification.  STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 122–37 (9th ed. 2016).   
142  I.R.C. § 166 (2018). 
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aggressive one consistently estimating that a higher fraction of debts would 
be collected.  The more aggressive firm would appear more profitable until, 
potentially years later, the actual collections would require the aggressive 
firm to adjust its accounting.  Moreover, judgments about what to disclose 
to the IRS are likely to consistently favor those companies that disclose just 
enough to avoid additional scrutiny but no more. 
With public access, a company would gain insight into the judgments 
other companies have made.  This includes financial items like bad debts and 
what disclosures to make to the IRS.143  As companies learned from one 
another, judgment calls would likely become more uniform across 
companies.  No company would have an incentive to make aggressive 
judgment calls that might call attention to itself, nor would companies feel 
compelled to be diffident if they could observe typical behavior.  As 
judgments become normalized, financial measures would better reflect firm 
business activities and not their discretion. 
Error.  Given that companies must record myriad transactions, it 
should come as no surprise that errors often appear in business tax 
accounting.144  According to a Bloomberg survey, tax errors caused 16% of 
firms to suffer unfavorable adjustments, 11% to miss tax breaks, and 7% to 
grossly miscalculate tax provisions.145  Some of these errors arose from 
information mismanagement, including incorrectly manually entering tax 
relevant data, accidentally deleting Microsoft Excel formulas designed to 
compute taxes, and overwriting tax relevant data.146  Other errors arose from 
an accidental failure to comply with tax law, for example by prematurely 
closing books, adjusting asset values for past years without making all the 
necessary adjustments for subsequent years, writing off business units that 
still had value, and prematurely expensing deferred compensation.147 
 143  For example, under the financial accounting reporting requirements, corporations must 
create financial reserves for uncertain tax positions.  These reserves account for the possibility 
that the corporation does not prevail in a tax dispute with the IRS.  Tax law requires 
corporations that create a reserve to disclose it to the IRS on Schedule UTP.  Since, however, 
the reserve is created at the discretion of the corporation, corporations may vary substantially 
in what they disclose.  Blank, supra note 6, at 93.  With public access to tax returns, 
corporations would develop a much better sense of what the disclosure norms are.  
 144  See BLOOMBERG BNA, TOP TAX & ACCOUNTING MISTAKES THAT COST COMPANIES
MILLIONS (2015) (conducting a survey of 200 in-house tax and accounting professionals at 
firms with revenues greater than one billion dollars).  Errors vary across industries.  Financial 
services firms are most likely to close books before collecting the necessary data; healthcare 
firms are most likely to struggle with city-specific regulations; and manufacturing firms have 
the greatest difficulty with depreciation and asset value issues.  Id.  In the individual income 
tax context, people also make errors, including not claiming credits.  See Bhargava & Manoli, 
supra note 5, at 3489.  
145  See BLOOMBERG, supra note 144. 
146  Id. 
147  Additional common errors include incorrectly applying unitary state tax rules, failing 
2019] CASE AGAINST BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY 57 
In some cases, these errors are detected quickly and corrected and 
ultimately do not affect the economic position of the company.  Other times, 
however, the company is not so lucky.  The detected errors can result in 
penalties or forgone benefits, affecting the economic circumstances of the 
firm.  If errors are never detected, they will also have an effect on the firm 
by either permanently increasing or decreasing firm value. 
With public access, if a business made a mistake in an Excel 
spreadsheet or neglected to claim a deduction, it would be far easier to detect.  
That company could compare its numbers to similar businesses, using their 
returns as a check.  If certain isolated numbers or ratios were substantially 
different, the company could take a closer look for errors. 
3. Towards Tax Uniformity
In the age of machine learning, firms would not be limited to side-by-
side comparisons between tax returns.  With public access, software 
developers could easily write algorithms that could process tax return 
information.148  This software could highlight suboptimal tax strategies, 
overly aggressive or diffident judgment calls, and accounting errors.  
Activist investors might serve as a catalyst by investing in firms with 
relatively poor tax performance and increasing shareholder value by 
upgrading tax performance, further homogenizing business tax outcomes.149  
This would level the playing field between companies and limit the 
advantages any one could gain over others by being more tax savvy.  Part III 
discusses why this is beneficial for the economy at large. 
While eliminating business tax privacy would move companies towards 
tax uniformity, it is unlikely that it would make tax compliance, planning, 
and execution perfectly uniform across firms for at least three reasons.  First, 
managers vary in their moral fiber and risk preferences.150  Some choose to 
evade taxes by filing false returns, some choose to push the envelope with 
to keep up with or comply with city-specific tax rules, failing to comply with state tax law 
when deducting dividends, and not reconciling partnership earnings with past earnings 
estimates.  The errors seem to stem from two sources: uninterested management and the 
limited input solicited from tax professionals in the design of the accounting systems.  Id. 
 148  Machine learning is “capable of identifying highly complex patterns in large datasets.” 
James Zou, Mikael Huss, Abubakar Abid, Pejman Mohammadi, & Ali Torkamani, A Primer 
on Deep Learning in Genomics, 51 NATURE GENETICS 12, 12 (2019), https://www.nature.com 
/articles/s41588-018-0295-5#auth-6.  The universe of business tax returns may be complex 
but is far simpler than the human genome.  
149  Blank, supra note 6, at 38. 
 150  Clearly not every CEO will go to the extreme of former Enron CEO, Jeffrey Skilling.  
Matt Stevens & Matthew Haag, Jeffrey Skilling, Former Enron Chief, Released After 12 Years 
in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/business/enron-
ceo-skilling-scandal.html?searchResultPosition=1.  
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aggressive tax strategies, and some choose to play it safe.151  Examining a 
false return will clearly not reveal that company’s true tax strategies, and a 
risk-averse manager is unlikely to adopt the aggressive tax strategies that 
could be gleaned from other returns.  Nonetheless, eliminating business tax 
privacy would get more eyes on tax returns, making tax evasion more 
difficult.152  And over the long-term, the range in tax risk-taking would 
decrease as aggressive tax planning would be publicly disciplined by the IRS 
and diffident tax planning would be publicly disciplined by investors 
pushing companies to more tax efficient strategies. 
Second, some tax shelters are particularly well suited to multinational 
corporations.  Businesses without affiliates in foreign countries will not be 
able to take advantage of transfer pricing to limit their tax liability.153  There 
is anecdotal evidence, however, that with a little legal wizardry even small 
domestic firms have found ways of using international tax sheltering 
strategies.154 
Third, dumb luck can affect a firm’s effective tax rate.  Consider, for 
example, two identical firms.  One makes a large capital expenditure on 
December 31, 2016, and the other makes the same large capital expenditure 
on January 1, 2017.  If Congress enacts a new tax provision that offers a 
substantial credit for capital expenditures made in 2017, then the second firm 
would have a lower 2017 effective tax rate.  Eliminating business tax privacy 
will do little to even the blows of fortune. 
All in all, tax privacy is a substantial barrier preventing firms from 
having the same tax outcomes—it essentially allows different firms to play 
by different tax rules.  Eliminating business tax privacy would decrease this 
tax variation across firms.  With public access, if a company found 
substantial inconsistencies, it could take a closer look to see if it had missed 
a tax avoidance opportunity, come to a different judgment regarding a tax 
 151  Tax evasion is illegal and typically involves either deliberately underreporting income 
or over reporting deductible expenses.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXAMPLES OF 
CORPORATE FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS – FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/compl 
iance/criminal-investigation/examples-of-general-tax-fraud-investigations-fiscal-year-2015.
The IRS estimates that in 2006 there was $67 billion of underreporting corporate tax liability, 
most of which was evasion.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GAP “MAP” TAX YEAR 2006 
(2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf.  It is worth noting that 
these numbers represent the position of the IRS and are not undisputed. 
152  Rice, supra note 10, at 125–62. 
 153  Corporate Tax Avoidance: The Price Isn’t Right, THE ECONOMIST: THE SCHUMPETER
BLOG (Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.economist.com/schumpeter/2012/09/21/the-price-isnt-
right.  
154  See Adam Sherwin, Crickhowell: Welsh Town Moves ‘Offshore’ to Avoid Tax on 
Local Business, INDEPENDENT, (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/cric 
khowell-welsh-town-moves-offshore-to-avoid-tax-on-local-business-a672897.1html 
(describing the local businesses in a Welsh town that used international tax sheltering 
strategies to minimize their tax liability).  
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issue, or made an error.  Over time, this learning process would make tax 
planning and compliance strategies more homogenous across firms. 
III. A WORLD WITHOUT BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY
The preceding Part explained how investors and businesses could use 
business tax return information.  This Part argues that eliminating business 
tax privacy will improve the allocation of economic resources in three ways.  
First, the more information investors have, the better they can direct their 
investment towards productive businesses.  Second, the more firms can learn 
from other firms, the more uniform tax planning and compliance will be 
across businesses, allowing businesses to compete for investment based on 
their productivity and not their tax-savviness.  Third, the more firms can 
learn from other firms, the fewer resources they will expend on tax 
compliance and planning strategies, leaving more resources available for 
other activities that are more valuable to society. 
A. Economic Efficiency
This Subpart shows how investing in the most profitable businesses 
generally leads to good productivity outcomes.  It also argues that freely 
flowing information helps productivity, setting the stage for the discussion 
of how business tax privacy is bad for productivity.155 
1. Profitability and Productivity
Businesses need investment to, among many other things, fund 
purchases of new assets, expand into new markets, develop innovative 
products, and pay off large expiring debts.156  In today’s competitive global 
markets, few if any businesses could survive long without at least 
intermittent external financing.  In the direst circumstance, a business with 
no appeal to investors would be dissolved and its assets would be distributed. 
Investors ultimately decide which businesses get what resources, and 
investors prefer the businesses that are most profitable.157  Fortunately for 
the economy, productivity and profitability are linked.  When a company 
produces something valuable, it makes a profit.  Thus, the profit motive often 
leads to the most productive companies receiving the most investment.158 
 155  For the purposes of this Article, efficiency is efficiency in allocation. See KRUGMAN
& WELLS,  supra note 18, at 29. 
 156  RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLE OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 2-4 (12th ed. 2017). 
157  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 156, at 7–9. 
 158  Other factors may also play a role in investing decisions, such as the labor or 
environmental practices of a corporation.  These factors, however, have a small effect 
compared to the profit motive, and many of these factors are entangled with the profit motive. 
For example, investors may prefer corporations that have high labor standards because they 
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The profit motive helps direct resources to the most productive use, but 
most unconstrained markets are flawed.159  Private incentives alone will not 
put society’s resources to their best use—or in economists’ lingo, private 
incentives alone will not achieve economic efficiency.160  If externalities 
from production and consumption are uncorrected or a monopoly sets prices 
above marginal cost, then the affected market is not efficient.161  How can 
society’s resources be at their best use when production decisions do not 
account for pollution and monopolies extract surplus from consumers?  This 
is where law has a role to play.  Law can change the relative profitability of 
different business activities.  Government can use regulations and taxes to 
steer businesses towards, for example, environmentally friendly products or 
production methods or limit the power of monopolies. 
A less conspicuous way in which government has an enormous impact 
on economic efficiency is by exerting control over the exchange of private 
information.  Obvious examples include patents,162 which are made publicly 
available, and mandated SEC reporting.163  Government is also a store of an 
incredible amount of information, which it may or may not choose to publish, 
including business tax returns.  Properly designed government intervention 
can help steer a market towards efficiency, but government policies can also 
have adverse impacts on the efficiency of markets.  This may be by design.  
Most governments willingly trade some economic efficiency for a more 
equitable distribution of resources.164  But some policies decrease efficiency 
with no apparent equity upside.  Business tax privacy is one such policy. 
believe that the law will eventually require corporations to meet those standards or because 
there is a reward from consumers or other stakeholders for exceptional labor or environmental 
practices. 
 159  See VARIAN, supra note 78, at 233, 432 for a theoretical analysis of the economic harm 
of monopoly power and externalities. 
 160  Economic efficiency is good for everyone on average.  It means better returns for 
investors, more technological development, lower prices, and higher wages.  But economic 
efficiency does not take into consideration equity issues.  Income distribution is important, 
and most people would gladly give up some efficiency for a more equitable income 
distribution.  The million-dollar question is how much efficiency should be traded for a more 
equitable income distribution.  This is a matter of value judgments: people can come to equally 
coherent but differing conclusions about this tradeoff.  I am not addressing equity concerns in 
this Article mainly because the available evidence on the equity consequences of business tax 
privacy is inconclusive.  
 161  See VARIAN, supra note 78, at 233, 432 for a theoretical analysis of the economic harm 
of externalities and monopoly power externalities.  
162  35 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2018). 
163  17 C.F.R. §210 (2016). 
 164  For example, the most economically efficient tax system would collect the same in 
taxes from every person regardless of their income.  No country in the world has adopted this 
lump-sum tax to collect substantial revenue.  Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 128, at 237.  
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2. An Illustration of Economic Efficiency
Before describing how business tax privacy impairs economic 
efficiency, it will be helpful to provide an illustration of how the profit 
motive moves resources to their best use.  For now, assume the flow of 
information between businesses and between investors and businesses is 
unconstrained.  The next Subpart relaxes this assumption and explores how 
impeding information flows with business tax privacy has an adverse effect 
on the allocation of society’s resources. 
Consider an investor who can invest in two corporations, Ford and GM.  
The investor may allocate investment between the two corporations however 
the investor likes.165  Ford and GM use the investment to produce 
environmentally friendly cars.166  The following table shows how investment 
in Ford increases both the number of cars Ford produces and Ford’s income.  
For ease of analysis, assume that each car generates $1 of income. 
Notice that cars manufactured and pre-tax income increase with 
investment.167  Assume GM has the following investment, cars 
manufactured, and income schedule. 
165  Assume that the investor rounds to the nearest dollar. 
 166  The cars are environmentally friendly so that the example is not complicated by 
negative externalities.  Assume that marginal car production is decreasing in investment for 
both firms.  In other words, the first dollar of investment will produce more cars than the 
second dollar, which will produce more cars than the third dollar, so on and so forth.  This is 
a standard assumption in economics.  It tends to be correct because the resources best suited 
for a given production activity are the ones first used for that production activity.  As the best 
resources are used up, less suitable ones are used which decreases marginal productivity.  In 
the absence of this assumption, it might be optimal for the investor to only choose one 
business to invest in. 
167  Notice also that each additional dollar of investment generates fewer cars—the first 
dollar of investment generates $6 of pre-tax income, but the second dollar only generates an 
additional $5. 
Ford investment schedule 
Investment Cars manufactured Income 
$0 0 $0 
1 6 6 
2 11 11 
3 15 15 
4 18 18 
5 20 20 
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The investor receives the entire income of the corporation and must decide 
how to allocate investment between the two corporations.168  The investor 
will set investment allocation to maximize the combined income of Ford and 
GM.169  If the investor had $5 to invest, the investor could allocate $5 to Ford 
and $0 to GM, $4 to Ford and $1 to GM, so on and so forth.  Each investment 
allocation would produce cars and generate income from Ford and GM, as 
per their investment schedules above. 
The table below shows the six whole dollar possible investment 
allocations and the resulting total car production and income generated. 
 168  Eventually, the investor will receive the income of the corporation either from 
dividends or share repurchases.  Abstracting away the tax consequences of transferring 
income from the firm to the investor greatly simplifies the model and only causes analytical 
wrinkles if the taxes paid on these transfers are correlated with the income function or 
effective tax rates of the firms.  If either of these correlations exists, the model could be 
modified to account for them.  In any case, the basic point the model illustrates holds true. 
 169  If the investor has optimized, an additional dollar of investment in either firm yields 
the same increase in income.  This allocation is optimal because at any other allocation the 
investor could shift $1 from the firm with lower marginal return to the firm with higher 
marginal return and increase her income.  In this example the marginal pre-tax incomes are 
close but not be equal because the investor is investing in whole dollars, not in fractions of 
dollars.  
GM investment schedule 
Investment Cars manufactured Income 
$0 0 $0 
1 7 7 
2 13 13 
3 18 18 
4 22 22 
5 25 25 
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The investor’s most profitable investment allocation is $2 in Ford and $3 in 
GM.  Every other investment allocation generates less income.  Note that 
this is also the allocation that leads to the most cars produced.  Because it 
maximizes the number of cars produced given the fixed investment of $5, 
this is the best investment allocation in terms of economic efficiency. 
In this example, everything works out for the best.  The investor 
maximizes profit and society maximizes cars produced.  But the outcome in 
this example rests on the assumptions that the investor had perfect 
knowledge about the profitability of Ford and GM, that neither Ford nor GM 
received additional investment for its tax-savviness, and that neither Ford 
nor GM expended resources developing tax compliance and planning 
strategies.  The next Subpart relaxes these assumptions to demonstrate how 
business tax privacy changes the picture. 
B. The Benefits of Eliminating Business Tax Privacy
The previous Section offered an illustration of economic efficiency.  
This Subpart explores the benefits of eliminating business tax privacy using 
that same GM and Ford example but restricting information flows.  First, it 
asks what would happen if investors had less information and thus made 
worse investing decisions.  Second, it asks what would happen if businesses 
could not learn from each other and thus some businesses gained a tax-
savviness advantage over others.  And third, it asks what would happen if, 
again, businesses could not learn from each other and thus had to redundantly 
develop the same tax strategies. 
1. Improving Investor Forecasts
Part IIA demonstrated that investors could use business tax return 










$5 $0 20 $20 
4 1 25 25 
3 2 28 28 
2 3 29 29 
1 4 28 28 
0 5 25 25 
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considering investing in.  Among other things, additional information helped 
investors distinguish between fixed and variable costs and one-time and 
recurring costs. 
In general, the more information investors have, the better their 
forecasts are.  Better forecasts positively affect not only investor profits but 
also the economy more generally by shifting investment to more productive 
companies.  Letting investors see tax return information improves forecasts 
and thus directs resources to the most profitable and therefore most 
productive activities. 
In the previous Section, an investor allocated investment between Ford 
and GM.  Now we add nuance to this example by considering two alternative 
scenarios—one in which the investor has access to business tax returns and 
a second in which the investor does not.  In each scenario, the investor 
forecasts car production.  The forecast with business tax return data is 
correct, and the forecast without tax return data is simply the best the investor 
can do with the information available.170  As the table below shows, the two 
forecasts do not agree about which investment allocation is best.  There are 
many reasons why a forecast may be incorrect, including those discussed in 
Part IIA.171  If the investor cannot observe business tax return information, 
the investor will choose the allocation based on the incorrect forecast. 
Without tax return data, the investor forecasts profit incorrectly and 
allocates $3 to Ford and $2 to GM, instead of $2 to Ford and $3 to GM, the 
 170  For simplicity, the incorrect forecast simply switches Ford and GM’s production 
schedules.  Any forecasting error, however, that changes the investor’s desired investment 
allocation will result in a similar decrease in production.  
 171  The examples in Part IIA included being unable to distinguish between one-time and 
recurring items, being unable to distinguish between fixed and variable costs, and forecasting 








Tax Return Data 
Total Car 
Forecast without 
Tax Return Data 
$5 $0 20 25 
4 1 25 28 
3 2 28 29 
2 3 29 28 
1 4 28 25 
0 5 25 20 
2019] CASE AGAINST BUSINESS TAX PRIVACY 65 
correct allocation.  This misallocation decreases car production by 3.4%.172  
Letting investors see tax return information improves these forecasts and 
thus directs resources to the most profitable and therefore most productive 
activities. 
In this example, the investor either made the correct or the incorrect 
forecast, depending on what information was available.  In practice, the same 
basic concepts apply, but instead of correct and incorrect forecasts the 
investor ends up with a more accurate or less accurate forecast.  Across many 
investments and over many years, more accurate forecasts divert investment 
to more productive businesses. 
An additional benefit to eliminating business tax privacy comes from 
making tax policy more transparent to investors.  Benevolent tax policy 
should be designed to induce a behavioral response from investors.  Ideally, 
tax policy should place higher tax burdens on firms that generate negative 
externalities to discourage investment in those firms and lower tax burdens 
on firms that generate positive externalities to encourage investment in those 
firms.  The more difficult it is for investors to know what current tax liability 
is and what future tax liability will be, the more muffled the intended 
behavioral response will be. 
Consider, for example, a tax policy that encourages R&D and thus 
benefits parties unrelated to the business undertaking the R&D.  This is an 
economically efficient policy, but if investors cannot observe the tax benefits 
of R&D, they may not reward a firm for its R&D activity.  As demonstrated 
in Part IIA, investors might assume the R&D tax incentive is nonrecurring 
or they might assume it is a risky tax shelter.  In either case, investors would 
underinvest in a firm providing positive externalities. 
2. Homogenizing Business Tax Outcomes
Even if investors have all the information they need, they would still 
invest in less productive businesses if those businesses were tax-savvy.  
Investors make their investing decisions based on forecasts of after-tax 
income.  If two firms are equally productive but one has a lower tax rate, the 
one with the lower tax rate will be a more attractive investment.  The same 
principle applies more generally: firms with lower tax rates will receive more 
investment relative to firms with higher tax rates.  If the differences in 
effective tax rates are large enough, then a less productive, low-tax firm 
would look more attractive to investors than a more productive, high-tax 
firm.173 
 172  A 3.4% difference in production matters: 3.4% of US GDP is hundreds of billions of 
dollars.  That is, however, not to say that this Article makes any estimate about how large the 
productivity gains from eliminating business tax privacy would be.  
173  Uniform taxes may distort decision making too if a uniform tax causes investors to 
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Rewarding a tax-savvy business with additional investment may make 
sense from an investor’s perspective but is not good for productivity.174  
Maximizing productivity requires that investment be allocated based solely 
on how productive businesses are.  Rewarding businesses that are tax-savvy 
at the expense of businesses that are less tax-savvy but more productive 
results in less economic output. 
In our example, if both Ford and GM faced the same effective tax rate, 
then taxes would not change investment allocation.  The tax would reduce 
the income derived from both firms by the same proportion.  Assuming 
overall investment did not decrease, the investor’s rate of return would fall, 
but the number of cars produced would remain the same. 
If, however, Ford and GM had different effective tax rates because one 
was more tax-savvy, the investor would shift her investment around to 
reduce total tax liability.175  Doing so would lower the pre-tax income of the 
investor, but the decreased tax burden would more than make up for the lost 
pre-tax income.  The larger the variance in tax outcomes across firms, the 
more investment would shift to tax-savvy firms, regardless of the 
productivity consequences. 
More concretely, assume that Ford has an effective tax rate of 10% and 
GM has an effective tax rate of 30%.  The following table computes after-
tax income for Ford and GM. 
reallocate their resources.  In the absence of an optimal tax purpose, however, non-uniform 
taxes have a much larger distortionary effect because they change the relative attractiveness 
of different firms, irrespective of their productivity. 
 174  That is not to say that all tax variation is bad.  Returning to our example, if GM uses a 
more toxic production process (which might explain why GM can produce cars at a lower 
cost) and the government determines that the optimal policy is to discourage investment in 
toxic production processes through the tax system, then GM should have a higher tax rate.  
While this results in fewer cars, it also results in greener production, which may be a beneficial 
tradeoff.  In general, tax rate variation may be beneficial if it corrects externalities, generates 
revenue with the smallest possible deadweight loss, or stimulates the economy in a recession.  
In each of those cases, the optimal tax policy might place a differentiated burden on different 
corporations.  But there is no economic efficiency rationale to divert scarce resources to a 
corporation because it has a lower effective tax rate stemming from its tax strategy.  In theory, 
it is possible that firms with better tax planning have more elastic responses to taxes, in which 
case it would decrease productivity to eliminate differentiated tax burdens.  
 175  The investor would maximize return by allocating investment such that both 
investments had equal after-tax marginal returns.  If at a certain allocation both firms had the 
same pre-tax marginal return, the investor could shift investment from the high tax firm to the 
low tax firm and increase income. 
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The more investment GM receives, the higher the combined effective tax 
rate of GM and Ford because GM has a higher effective tax rate.  Just as 
before, the highest pre-tax income is generated if the investor allocates $2 to 
Ford and $3 to GM.  If, however, the investor moves $1 from GM to Ford, 
then pre-tax income will fall by $1 to $28, but tax liability will fall by even 
more, by $1.10, from $6.50 to $5.40.  The investor loses $1 of after-tax 
income but gains $1.10 of after-tax income.  Thus, from the investor’s 
perspective, the optimal investment allocation is $3 in Ford and $2 in GM.  
But this is not optimal from an economic efficiency perspective.  This 
investment allocation reduces the number of cars manufactured from 29 to 
28, as compared to the pre-tax or no-tax case.  The tax variation led to a 
worse investment allocation.  The total number of cars produced decreased 
by 3.4%, even though the total investment, $5, did not change. 
It does not matter which firm has the lower effective tax rate.  Even 
though in this example GM produces more cars at each level of investment, 
the total number of cars produced declines when GM has the lower effective 
tax rate.  To illustrate this point, the following table shows investment 













$5.00 $0.00 $20.00 $2.00 $18.00 
4.00 1.00 25.00 3.90 21.10 
3.00 2.00 28.00 5.40 22.60 
2.00 3.00 29.00 6.50 22.50 
1.00 4.00 28.00 7.20 20.80 
0.00 5.00 25.00 7.50 17.50 
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From the investor’s perspective, the optimal investment allocation is $1 in 
Ford and $4 in GM.  But this is not optimal from an economic efficiency 
perspective.  This investment allocation reduces the number of cars 
manufactured from 29 to 28, compared to the pre-tax or no-tax case.  Once 
more, tax variation led to a worse investment allocation.  The total number 
of cars produced decreased by 3.4%, even though the total investment, $5, 
did not change.  In the global economy, a decrease in the production of goods 
and services by even a fraction of a percent would result in hundreds of 
billions of dollars of lost production. 
There are many ways to add nuance to this model, but the fundamental 
point remains: tax variation changes investment allocation.176  Firms with 
lower effective tax rates will receive more investment than they would have 
if all firms faced the same effective tax rate. 
How does all this relate to business tax privacy?  Recall from Part IIB 
that corporations are very unlikely to have identical effective tax rates 
because of differences in strategy, discretion, and error—among other 
things.  But eliminating business tax privacy would allow every firm to learn 
from the returns of other businesses.  With public access to business tax 
returns, businesses would adopt each other’s tax strategies, make the same 
judgment calls, and find errors in their own tax accounting.  Tax preparers 
(who would be partially freed from confidentiality agreements), activist 
investors, and consulting firms could catalyze tax outcome 
homogenization.177  This would lead to business tax standards for successful 
tax avoidance (i.e. benchmarking), and firms could be evaluated along 
 176  The above logic applies equally well when there is an arbitrary number of firms, when 
there is a secondary market for investment securities, when the model is dynamic, and when 
investment supply is responsive to return.  These modifications would not alter the 
fundamental result of the model.  












$5.00 $0.00 $20.00 $6.00 $14.00 
4.00 1.00 25.00 6.10 18.90 
3.00 2.00 28.00 5.80 22.20 
2.00 3.00 29.00 5.10 23.90 
1.00 4.00 28.00 4.00 24.00 
0.00 5.00 25.00 2.50 22.50 
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avoidance metrics just as they could for customer satisfaction and workplace 
safety.178 
Eliminating business tax privacy would make tax planning and 
compliance strategies more homogenous across firms, making the relative 
marginal profits of firms depend less on their tax strategies.  In essence, tax 
privacy is a barrier preventing firms from having the same tax compliance 
and planning, which allows different firms to play by different tax rules. 
Firms should receive more investment if they are more productive, but there 
is no social benefit to rewarding firms that have lower tax rates because of 
their tax compliance and planning strategies.  Making business tax 
compliance and planning strategies more homogenous across businesses 
reduces the variation in effective business tax burdens and ultimately leads 
to businesses receiving investment commensurate to their productivity and 
not how tax savvy they are.179 
3. Reducing Tax Compliance Costs
Beyond generating undesirable tax variation that distorts investment, 
business tax privacy inflates already substantial business tax planning and 
compliance costs.  To comply with tax law, businesses must record their 
transactions, submit documents to the IRS, and remit payment.  This is not a 
simple exercise: GE’s annual corporate tax returns fill approximately 57,000 
pages.180  Businesses also exert considerable effort structuring transactions 
to minimize tax liability.181  Recall that GE’s tax department, at one time the 
best tax law firm in the world, employed nearly 1,000 people.182  More 
generally, the IRS estimates that taxpayers spend nearly six billion hours per 
year complying with tax law, 359 million hours of which are spent by 
178  Id.; Blank, supra note 6, at 62–8. 
 179  Another benefit of uniform tax compliance and planning is that it would make the cost 
of valuing firms lower because investors could correctly assume a smaller range of possible 
business tax strategies.  
180  John McCormack, GE Filed 57,000-Page Tax Return, Paid No Taxes on $14 Billion 
in Profits, WKLY STANDARD (Nov. 17, 2011, 1:11 PM), http:// www.weeklystandard.com/blo 
gs/ge-filed-57000-page-tax-return-paid-no-taxes-14-billion-profits_609137.html.  Although 
a considerable portion of GE’s tax efforts are directed at compliance, GE also directs 
substantial resources towards sheltering its income.  
 181  Lillian Mills, Merle M. Erickson & Edward L. Maydew, Investments in Tax Planning, 
20 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1, 1 (1998). Accounting firms provide tax services for businesses 
looking to minimize tax liability.  See generally Tim Anson et al., Integrated Global 
Structuring: Aligning Global Business Models and Tax Planning, INT’L TAX SERVS.,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2008).  
 182  David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html.  
Businesses more generally also spend substantial amounts on tax compliance and planning.  
Lillian Mills, Merle M. Erickson & Edward L. Maydew, Investments in Tax Planning, 10 J. 
AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1 (1998). 
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corporations on their returns.183 
Businesses and practitioners cannot learn from each other’s work 
because business tax returns are private.184  This means that (1) each firm 
must pay its own in-house or external tax practitioners and (2) no single tax 
practitioner can look at all the business tax returns together and derive the 
most efficient tax strategies.  As a result, several tax consultants redundantly 
develop the same tax strategies and write similar tax opinions.185  
Consequently, business tax privacy generates substantial economic waste.186 
Making returns public would disseminate tax-sheltering knowledge.  
With access to the universe of returns, consultancies would be able to use 
machine learning and sophisticated statistical techniques that would find the 
best tax strategies.187  Whatever one thinks of tax-efficient strategizing, this 
approach would eliminate the economic waste inherent in redundant tax 
planning.188  The tax reform passed in late 2017, for example, has already 
 183  TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 1 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 13 (2008), https://www 
.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_intro_toc_msp.pdf. 
 184  There is substantial variation to the extent that businesses outsource tax compliance 
and planning.  Some businesses perform tax compliance functions internally, some outsource 
them, but most fall between these extremes.  GE, for example, once had a tax department that 
employed 1,000 people, but many of those employees now work for PWC.  Amato, supra 
note 135. For businesses that perform tax compliance internally, business tax privacy clearly 
increases compliance costs because businesses cannot see how other corporations handle 
similar tax issues.  Instead each business must independently and redundantly research myriad 
tax issues.  For businesses that outsource tax compliance, business tax privacy increases 
compliance costs but these costs are mitigated, albeit only slightly, by the fact that the law 
and accounting firms that provide tax compliance services can develop in-house knowledge 
that multiple clients will receive.  Nevertheless, two factors limit the extent to which 
compliance costs are held down by large accounting and law firms.  First, business tax privacy 
may still limit the extent to which accountants and lawyers can use tax knowledge developed 
for one client to service another.  Second, the markets that accounting and law firms operate 
in are not competitive, increasing the ability of these large firms to profitably engage in 
redundant work. 
 185  See James R. Hines Jr., On the Timeliness of Tax Reform, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1043 (2004) 
(showcasing a model in which eliminating tax shelters quickly increases the total expenditure 
on socially wasteful activities as firms seek to develop new tax shelters).  
 186  Society is devoting scare resources to redundantly researching tax shelters when those 
resources could instead be used to produce goods and services, advance science, teach the 
young, or perform any number of other valuable functions.  Of course, there is another 
possibility: ending corporate privacy could demonstrate the efficacy of tax consultants and 
increase their use.  Given the prevalence of aggressive tax planning and sheltering, this is 
unlikely.  
 187  Some software already exists—for example, GoSystem and Fast Tax.  These programs 
are designed to reduce compliance costs (much like TurboTax for individual taxpayers), 
which will lower tax variation.  A sophisticated program using big data and machine learning, 
however, would be able to do much more.  
 188  Some scholars believe that corporations are near the maximum possible sheltering.  
Lee Sheppard, Should Corporate Tax Returns Be Disclosed?, 142 TAX NOTES 1381, 1382 
(2014) (quoting Reuven Avi-Yonah, who suggests that we are near the maximum possible 
corporate aggressiveness).  If that is the case, it would be better for society to let corporations 
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increased the revenues of the largest accounting firms by billions of 
dollars.189  Each of these firms is researching the same topics, and some of 
these topics may be researched independently for many different clients 
because business tax privacy prevents businesses from learning from one 
another. 
Society can realize substantial benefits from innovation. There are 
numerous examples of recent technologies that have improved and saved 
lives, including safer automobiles, new medicines, and advances in 
communications technology. But the reasoning that suggests we should 
encourage or protect these innovations does not apply to tax shelters.  Most 
tax shelters do not make the world better off because they do not create 
anything of value.  They simply change the distribution of tax burdens and 
drain resources that could have been used more beneficially.  Moreover, tax 
shelters encourage a race to the bottom because no business wants to be at a 
disadvantage.190  Businesses devote resources to developing tax shelters 
because if they do not, another business will, and that business will become 
more attractive to investors. 
C. The Potential Costs of Eliminating Business Tax Privacy
Eliminating business tax privacy will improve investor decision-
making, reduce capital misallocation, and decrease waste from redundant 
business tax compliance and planning costs.  But the same spreading of 
information that has these benefits may also have some downsides.  This 
Subpart considers the most costly of these downsides and suggests reasons 
why eliminating business tax privacy may nonetheless be the better policy. 
1. Lower Business Tax Revenue
Some scholars have suggested that eliminating business tax privacy 
would lower government revenue.191  With access to the universe of business 
maintain those shelters without redundant shelter-development expenditures. 
 189  Michael Cohn, Tax Reform Boosts Consulting Revenue for Accounting Firms, ACCT.
TODAY (June 6, 2018), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/tax-reform-law-boosts-cons 
ulting-revenue-for-big-four-accounting-firms. 
 190  Firms expending resources to lower their tax liability is rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking 
entails using scarce resources in a manner that produces no social value to secure some private 
benefit.  See generally Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 
63 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).  It’s possible that all businesses would agree to substantially 
limit tax sheltering if they could be sure that all other businesses would do the same.  This 
would allow them to direct resources to other more productive endeavors.  
 191  There are unlikely scenarios in which a better understanding of IRS enforcement 
would lead firms to adopt less aggressive tax strategies.  In that case (examining this argument 
alone), government revenue would increase if business tax privacy were eliminated.  
Businesses learning from one another would lead to additional government revenue if, for 
example, firms learned to keep away from aggressive strategies that the IRS might combat.  
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tax returns, businesses would learn more about different tax sheltering 
strategies.192  Moreover, firms could estimate a tax aggressiveness frontier, 
essentially determining which combinations of tax strategies are safe from 
IRS action and which are not.193  Firms would have an incentive to opt for 
the maximum tax aggressiveness that would not invite additional IRS 
scrutiny.  Combined, this tax shelter proliferation and lost IRS strategic 
advantage would allow firms to have a lower effective tax rate. 
There are, however, two reasons to doubt that this revenue reduction 
will be substantial.  First, eliminating business tax privacy increases the tax 
base by increasing productivity.  Thus, while effective tax rates may fall, 
those rates will be applied to more business income, and a smaller rate times 
a larger base has an ambiguous effect on revenue.  Second, more eyes on 
business tax returns are likely to increase compliance by reducing tax 
evasion and extremely aggressive tax avoidance.194  Thus, while some tax 
sheltering strategies are likely to become commonplace, others are likely to 
become less used. 
Even if there were a substantial reduction in revenue, Congress could 
easily change fiscal policy along another dimension to recuperate that 
revenue.195  Optimal tax policy requires collecting tax revenues sufficient to 
fund the government, taking equity, efficiency, and administration 
considerations into account.196  And if, as this Article argues, business tax 
privacy is a very economically inefficient means by which to maintain 
government revenue, then we are better off eliminating business tax privacy 
and recuperating the lost revenue with another policy.197 
2. Proprietary Business Information Made Public
Some have asserted that business tax returns contain information that, 
Investors learning from business tax returns would also lead to additional government revenue 
if, for example, investors flocked to firms with conservative tax approaches. 
192  Blank, supra note 6, at 62–69. 
193  Assuming the IRS did not change its enforcement strategy.  
194  Rice, supra note 10, at 125–62. 
195  Since 1985, Congress has made several changes to the income tax, including changing 
corporate statutory rates.  See, e.g, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 
2249; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 2264 Stat. 166. 
 196  Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 128, at 14. Indeed, because government revenue is not 
an end in itself, it is possible but highly unlikely given the federal government current budget, 
that the revenue need not be recuperated.  
 197  I take no position here on what the better alternatives are but will note two possibilities. 
One, Congress could simply increase corporate tax rates—this could generate revenues 
equivalent to the status quo much more efficiently.  Two, the US could adopt a value-added 
tax as suggested by many in tax policy circles.  In the unlikely case that the costs of raising 
revenue using other policy dimensions are exceedingly high, a welfare maximization and a 
government revenue maximization paradigm would yield the same result: business tax 
privacy is the better policy.  
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if released, could harm businesses.198  Although there are many pieces of 
information that a business might not want public, this argument seems 
specifically to refer to information that competitors could use to that 
business’s disadvantage.199 
While this raises a plausible issue, there are two reasons why it is 
unlikely that publicizing proprietary information on tax returns will cause 
severe economic disruptions—it may even have economic benefits.  First, 
access to proprietary information is a two-way street.  Firm A certainly does 
not want Firm B to see its information.  But Firm A does want to see Firm 
B’s information.  If business tax privacy is eliminated, Firm A will benefit 
at Firm B’s expense because A can see B’s tax return, but B will also benefit 
at A’s expense because B can see A’s return.  The proprietary information 
argument ignores this symmetry: competitors should both benefit from and 
be hurt by additional access to information.  Of course, this is not to say that 
all firms would be equally benefited or hurt by the policy, but in aggregate 
this is not so dire a concern as some have claimed.  Ultimately, the efficiency 
gains described above make eliminating business tax privacy a net positive 
for businesses. 
Second, and more importantly, access to proprietary information would 
increase competitiveness, which would have widespread economic 
benefits.200  Business tax privacy makes it easier for businesses to hide what 
their best products and best markets are, which increases their market 
power—their ability to sell at higher prices with less innovation.  If 
competitors could access proprietary information, businesses would become 
more competitive, which would drive down prices and increase 
innovation.201 
The proprietary information argument becomes somewhat more 
compelling when considered from a global perspective.  Eliminating 
business tax privacy might disadvantage US businesses because they would 
have to disclose information that their foreign competitors would not—
 198  This information includes “revenue and expense information by legal entity, 
jurisdiction, and functional category.”  Tax Executives Institute, supra note 7, at 242. 
199  Id. 
 200  A student at the University of Richmond School of Law raised the possibility that 
business tax information could be used to conduct espionage on firms that provide goods and 
services to the US military.  If this is the case, then clearly those firms should be exempted 
from public disclosure.  
201  The benefits from increased competition would have to be weighed against any 
chilling effect on investment.  It is possible that a business might not choose to invest in a 
new product line or market because it did not believe it could realize a sufficient return on the 
initial investment if other competitors became aware of this business move.  This is only 
possible in the somewhat unusual circumstance where the first mover must pay substantial 
investment costs that subsequent movers will not have to pay.  Intellectual property law may 
prevent this from being a substantial cost.  
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although some countries do require some business tax disclosures.202 It is, 
however, not clear to what extent business tax information would be a boon 
to foreign competitors.  The US subsidiaries of foreign businesses would still 
have to disclose their US returns, so to the extent that a foreign advantage 
would materialize, it would have to stem from non-US business operating 
outside the US.  Moreover, investor preferences for transparency may lead 
to US firms becoming substantially more attractive for global investment.203  
Finally, because the US has substantial clout, other countries may follow suit 
and also limit business tax privacy. 
3. Elimination of Tax-related Jobs
The one group that benefits unequivocally from the current rules are 
those that develop the tax shelters—mostly accountants and lawyers that 
may work for a business or a consultancy that advises many businesses.  If 
business tax privacy were eliminated, the value of developing new tax 
shelters would diminish and the demand for tax accountants and lawyers 
might shrink. 
There are two reasons, however, why this potential cost should not be 
a major factor when evaluating business tax privacy.  First, even with 
business tax privacy eliminated, the tax code will still be very long and very 
complex.  Tax compliance and planning will still require many lawyers and 
accountants.  Second, in the long run, the world is better off with fewer 
people developing tax shelters because they would instead be doing 
something more valuable.  In the United States, there are few remaining 
telephone operators, typewriter repair-people, and stable attendants.  Despite 
the fact that these were commonplace jobs within the not so distant past, 
current employment rates are unaffected by the disappearance of these jobs.  
Policymakers should be cognizant of the hardships experienced when the 
economic forces that feed an industry dry up, but the solution should be to 
help with the transition, not prop up unproductive industries. 
4. Reduced Tax Compliance
Businesses do not want to share their tax information.  To that end, if 
business tax privacy were eliminated, businesses might reduce their 
compliance with tax law to keep some information private.204  This is 
202  Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 811–12. 
 203  See generally Virgina Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for 
Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 664 (2016) (discussing the value of 
transparency in investment).  
204  Letter from Robert L. Ashby, International President, Tax Executives Inst., to Paul H. 
O’Neil, Secretary, Dep’t of the Treasury, and Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n (July 25, 2002) (“Confidentiality of tax return information is a key privacy right that 
should be vindicated not just for its own sake, but because it is the cornerstone of voluntary 
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certainly a possibility, though it remains an open question how large this 
effect would be.  If returns were made public, investors might reward firms 
for revealing more information, in which case the IRS might experience 
increased compliance with tax law.  Moreover, evidence suggests that 
additional scrutiny tends to lead to increased compliance, and eliminating 
business tax privacy would result in substantially more scrutiny.205  Variants 
of the algorithms that would help businesses optimize their tax compliance 
and planning could be used to detect non-compliance.  And if Congress and 
the IRS suspect reduced compliance, they could alter audit procedures and 
non-compliance penalties to minimize the negative effects of reduced 
compliance. 
5. Antitrust Concerns
There are two antitrust concerns associated with eliminating business 
tax privacy.  First, businesses attempting to collude with one another could 
use tax returns to help verify that their partners are not deviating from the 
collusion agreement.  Second, one business might be able to reverse-
engineer cost data for a competitor and undercut that competitor.  Both of 
these are legitimate concerns, but the obvious policy remedy for these 
anticompetitive behaviors is antitrust law.  Using tax privacy to achieve 
better antitrust outcomes has all the undesirable economic efficiency 
consequences discussed in this Article—consequences that would be 
avoided if antitrust law were used to address these antitrust concerns. 
D. Alternatives to Eliminating Business Tax Privacy
Several policy prescriptions might alleviate the economic distortions 
caused by business tax privacy without eliminating business tax privacy.  A 
simpler tax code could limit the potential for tax sheltering, decrease 
compliance costs, and make forecasting future tax liability easier.206  Lower 
compliance”).  See also Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 826; Hoopes, 
Robinson & Slemrod supra note 46 (finding evidence that large private firms in Australia 
acted to avoid disclosure in anticipation of new public disclosure requirements). 
205  Rice, supra note 10, at 125–62. 
 206  If the taxes were as simple as possible (i.e. a lump sum tax), then (1) businesses could 
not meaningfully have differentiated tax preparation and tax sheltering technologies, (2) 
businesses would not spend socially valuable resources to develop new tax strategies, and (3) 
investors would have no difficulty forecasting future tax liability.  A lump sum tax would 
incentivize firms to merge, so investors would have to anticipate mergers to correctly forecast 
tax liability.  Another possibility is using formulary apportionment to allocate taxable income. 
See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation 
in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, in PATH TO
PROSPERITY: HAMILTON PROJECT IDEAS ON INCOME SECURITY, EDUCATION, AND TAXES 319, 
327 (Jason Furman & Jason E. Bordoff eds., 2008); Susan Morse, Revisiting Global 
Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593 (2010).  
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business tax rates would reduce the incentive to tax-shelter, which would 
decrease tax variation and the extent to which tax decisions determine firm 
value.207  Eliminating business taxes would render the entire debate moot. 
Tweaking the Internal Revenue Code to make business tax returns 
public has two advantages over these other policy prescriptions.  First, it does 
not require any major legislation—it only requires a few modifications to the 
Internal Revenue Code’s section on tax privacy.208  To the extent that more 
complicated legislation is less likely to be enacted or more likely to have 
unintended consequences, eliminating business tax privacy will be 
preferable.  Second, businesses already file tax returns.  Thus, businesses 
will bear no additional compliance costs if business tax privacy is eliminated.  
Solutions that involve other changes to the tax code would create additional 
compliance burdens, as would any solution that required firms to prepare 
additional documents. 
Others have suggested that some businesses, particularly corporations, 
should be compelled to publish very limited information from their tax 
returns—for example, their tax liability or, for public companies, a 
reconciliation between their financial statements and taxes paid.209  While 
these additional disclosures may have some benefits, they will not 
substantially mitigate the economic distortions addressed here because the 
real value of business tax returns comes from the detailed information, not 
bottom line numbers.  From the perspective of investors, the more 
information they have, the better.  Knowing the exact business tax liability 
for one year will not be particularly useful for investors because, without 
understanding the components of tax liability, investors will still be 
handicapped when attempting to forecast future tax liability.  Similarly, if 
businesses are unable to learn exactly what other businesses are up to, then 
the extent to which tax compliance and planning strategies will flow between 
businesses will be limited.  Without this exchange of information, 
investment will not be redirected to more productive firms and redundant, 
socially wasteful expenditures on tax compliance and planning will not 
decrease. 
 207  This would necessitate raising revenue from other sources to be a revenue neutral 
policy.  See generally Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Shifting the Burden of Taxation 
from the Corporate to the Personal Level and Getting the Corporate Tax Rate Down to 15 
Percent, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 643 (2016).  
208  I.R.C. § 6103. 
 209  See, e.g., Lenter, Slemrod & Shackelford, supra note 6, at 803, 821; Blank, supra note 
6, at 62–69. 
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CONCLUSION 
Economic efficiency is paramount to tax policy, but on one important 
issue—whether businesses should be entitled to tax privacy—the efficiency 
criterion has received short shrift.  This Article evaluates business tax 
privacy using the same efficiency criteria applied to other tax issues and 
argues that eliminating business tax privacy would be beneficial.  Public 
access to business tax returns was a feature of the country’s first corporate 
tax legislation.  Economic efficiency considerations commend a return to our 
original approach. 
